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Syrian-Lebanese Refugee Hosting Model: 
A Compromise between Refugee Rights and Fears of Host Community 
Ghinwa Yatim  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has been affecting host communities in 
different ways. It is true that refugees are suffering from economic, social, health, 
and legal difficulties; however, one cannot overlook economic and security threats 
they might pose on Lebanese community. Despite tough circumstances, the Lebanese 
government did not take any practical steps to organize the presence of Syrian 
refugees. It only scrutinized hosting policies to discourage mass influx. At a time 
when repatriation is not an option, this thesis aims to explore hosting models that can 
accommodate refugees’ needs while exploring the demographic fears of host 
community. The proposed hosting model is developed based on field research and a 
comparative case analysis that draws best practices and lessons derived from hosting 
strategies of Palestinians in Lebanon, and more recently, Syrians in Jordan. 
Keywords: Syrian Refugees, Palestinian Refugees, Hosting Models, Camps, 
Displacement, Refugee Policy  
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Chapter 1 
An Introduction to the Situation of Syrian 
Refugees in Lebanon 
 
The second decade of the 21st century has been a burden on humanity. A 
refugee crisis described as the worst crisis since World War II has emerged. With 
more than 21 million refugees from different countries, the world has found itself 
obliged to share the burden of this crisis. According to United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 53% of refugees worldwide came from three 
countries: Somalia, Afghanistan, and Syria. Refugees coming from Syria are on the 
top of the list. The number of those who are registered with UNHCR was 4.9 million 
as these lines were written. However, the number of displaced Syrians might be 
much higher especially that many are still not registered with UNHCR. Looking at 
UNHCR’s figures, Lebanon is one of the top hosting countries with refugees from 
Palestine, Syria, and Iraq (Figures at a Glance). 
This crisis has severely affected Lebanon, as it hosts the largest number of 
Syrian refugees per capita. Indeed, in 2015 the number of officially registered Syrian 
refugees was 1,017,433 million (Syria Regional Refugee Response). However, the 
Lebanese government believes that the real number surpasses a million and half. Not 
only many Syrians are not registered, but also “as of 6 May 2015, UNHCR Lebanon 
has temporarily suspended new registration as per Government of Lebanon's 
instructions. Accordingly, individuals awaiting to be registered are no longer 
included” (Syria Regional Refugee Response). To reflect the complexity of refugees’ 
situation in Lebanon, Amnesty international described that one of every five 
Lebanese is a Syrian refugee (Syria's Refugee Crisis in Numbers).   
Lebanon has accepted the burden, although it is not a member of United 
Nations 1951 refugee convention and despite its stagnating economic and social 
situation, in addition to security fears. Due to its location on the Syrian borders, 
along with historic and family ties, Lebanon at the beginning of crisis adopted the 
policy of open borders. However, this ended in 2015 due to economic burdens and 
social difficulties with host communities. Despite these economic difficulties, the 
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UNHCR also highlighted that only 52% of the funding needed to provide refugees’ 
basic requirements was met.  
Currently, some refugees are scattered in unofficial camps, or in informal 
settlements as UNHCR refers to. Others have self-settled in poor areas close to the 
borders. Despite the humble assistance provided to refugees, host communities not 
only started viewing them as a threat but also envied them for getting minimal 
financial assistance.  
The economic fears topped a list of issues that worried host communities. 
According to World Bank, labor supply in Lebanon increased by at least 30% in 
2014, pushing thousands of additional Lebanese into poverty (Lebanon - Economic 
and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict). As demands increased, prices 
of goods increased along with housing rents, at a time when wages simultaneously 
decreased. Moreover, with the continuous sectarian war in Syria that might change 
the map of the Syrian state, Lebanese are afraid that large number of Syrians might 
not be able to return to Syria; a concern that was also reflected in fear of 
naturalization. 
 Additionally, the Lebanese fear that Syrian refugees might initiate political 
activity similar to the Palestinians in 1960s, threatening the security and sovereignty 
of Lebanese state is a point of concern for many Lebanese. (Ben et al. 2013).  
 
1.1 Situation of Syrians in Lebanon 
All of the previously mentioned points have increased the misery of Syrian 
refugees who are already suffering from hardship, poverty, and displacement. In 
several instances, refugees were attacked both physically and verbally. In addition to 
their deteriorated economic status, they are facing discrimination and had to deal 
with social resentment. 
Although Lebanese fears might be legitimate, they increased the intolerable 
suffering of refugees. Thus the question is: how can the need of granting the Syrian 
refugees minimal human rights be balanced with fears and needs of host societies? 
To answer this question one should first explore the main types of hosting 
models that refugees around the world resorted to. Hosting models are usually 
divided into two main types: an open inclusive system that incorporates refugees in 
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the general population against a more exclusive system based on grouping the 
refugees within internments and camps.  
In Lebanon, Syrian refugees resorted to both hosting models. However, the 
camps are still unofficial and are scattered in different Lebanese areas.  
The advantages and disadvantages of both models should be studied, in 
addition to the exploration of when should each model be used and which one could 
guarantee a minimum of rights to Syrian refugees, keeping in mind the fears of host 
community.  
Thus, this thesis tries to find out what is the best refugee hosting model that 
can guarantee such a balance, by studying the situation of both Syrian refugees and 
Lebanese host community. This thesis explores the fears of both groups studying 
various economic, social, and security variables. It also tries to probe solutions to 
economic and social impasse.  
This is an exploratory study that will address possible solutions. The 
methodology of this thesis will be guided by exploring hosting methods that can best 
improve Syrian refugees’ lives, while examining the ways and means to improve 
relations with host communities. Guiding this inquiry is a constant referral to the 
experience of Palestinian refugees in different host countries.   
The study gathers empirical data from the experiences of refugees and host 
societies, focusing on the relation between both groups. This exploratory study also 
focuses on Lebanon’s experience in hosting two different groups of refugees: 
Palestinians and Syrians. It also includes a comparison with other host countries who 
have managed refugees’ influx of both groups.  In particular, this thesis examines the 
host models used by the Jordanians while dealing with their Palestinians and Syrian 
refugees, compared to Lebanon.  
The first part of this thesis will study the case of Syrian refugees living in 
three different Lebanese areas: a Sunni village, a Shiite village and a Christian 
village. The visit aims at exploring the situation of refugees living in areas with 
distinct particularities trying to get an overall understanding about the living 
conditions of Syrian refugees. The study incudes both: refugees living in informal 
settlements in addition to self-settled Syrian refugees. Also the situation of Lebanese 
host community in each area will be explored to study the economic and social 
difficulties confronted in each area.  
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The researcher was able to proceed with her field study after getting an 
approval from LAU Institutional Review Board (IRB). The board approved her 
human research related to Syrian refugees before it was published. This approval 
assures that research conducted abides by the ethical principles of the Belmont 
Report along with regulations and guidelines governing research. She also completed 
NIH online training and got a certificate that confirms her official eligibility to 
conduct investigations involving human subject.   
The second axis of analysis consists of conducting a comparison on two 
levels: the first between Palestinian and Syrian refugees who fled to Lebanon. The 
second is a cross-country comparison mainly between Lebanon and Jordan 
examining the Jordanian host model that was applied to both Syrians and Palestinian 
refugees. This thesis will include research, observations, and case studies in order to 
come out with possible recommendation for the hosting method of Syrian refugees in 
Lebanon. 
 
1.2 Methodology 
This thesis used the comparative research method as opposed to the 
experimental or the statistical methods. In general, research methods aim at scientific 
explanation, consisting of the establishment of general empirical relationships among 
two or more variables, while all other variables are held constant (Lijphart 246). 
Nevertheless, the comparative method suffers from two interrelated 
problems: the existence of too many variables, and a small number of cases. The 
former is common to virtually all social science research regardless of the particular 
method and renders the problem of handling many variables more difficult to solve 
(Babbie 282). Therefore, in order to minimize this problem Lijphart suggests several 
remedies, like increasing the number of cases or focusing on comparable cases, or 
analyzing a single country diachronically, a “comparison that of the same unit at 
different times generally offers a better solution to the control problem than 
comparison of two or more different but similar units” (Lijphart 253). Diachronical 
studies have more constants and relatively fewer variables than in many cross-
national studies. This is expected to narrow the scope of research, yet secure results 
that are more robust. Additionally, by using both a diachronical study and comparing 
both the Palestinian refugees crisis to the Syrian one in Lebanon, this thesis also does 
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a cross-national comparison of how both Jordan and Lebanon reacted to Palestinian 
and Syrian refugees’ crisis. Thus, this thesis utilizes the two different research 
approaches, strengthening their benefits and minimizing their weaknesses. (Jouhari 
7)   
This thesis will utilize main sources (books, articles, and academic journals 
and articles) that tackled the primary theoretical issues explored therein, in addition 
to primary and secondary sources for data analysis and comparison.  
 
1.3 Theoretical Approach  
Previous literature agrees that there is no single theory that exclusively 
explains the issue of refugees and how states respond to them. Most of studied cases 
used a combination of realism, liberalism, and constructivism to explain refugee’s 
crisis within the scope of international relations.  
Based on Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner’s The Limits of International 
Law, the realist approach places importance on material threat and pressure from 
stronger states, while explaining the relationship between host states and refugees. 
Material threats can be either the benefits that a state gains in return of hosting 
refugees, or the cumulative bargaining power that the host state can achieve on the 
international arena. 
 
A second strategic position in which states find themselves can be called 
coercion. One state, or a coalition of states with convergent interests, forces 
other states to engage in actions that serve the interest of the first state or 
states. To understand this strategic situation, imagine that a large and 
powerful state initially can threaten to punish a small and weak state that 
engages in any action X. The cost of punishing the small state is trivial. The 
small state then chooses to engage in the action or not, and the large state 
responds by punishing the small state or not (Goldsmith and Posner 28). 
 
Although, this might be true with some cases, a closer look at the Lebanese 
situation shows us that realism does not explain the relation between Lebanon and 
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the refugees it hosts. It is worth mentioning that Lebanon is not a member of United 
Nations 1951 refugee convention, thus no one can force it to host refugees. 
Moreover, although international community appreciated how the Lebanese state 
contained the refugees, this didn’t strengthen the bargaining power of the Lebanese 
government.  
The first answer that comes to one’s mind while asking why Lebanon agreed 
to host Syrian refugees is definitely the shared Arab identity and common history. 
Constructivism assures that countries respond to refugees based on shared identity, 
norms, culture, and beliefs.  
According to Karen Jacobsen “many border communities share ethnic and 
kinship ties, increasing the likelihood that refugees from the other side of the border 
will be welcomed and assisted” (Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host 
Governments 669). This particularly explains why Lebanon and Jordan agreed to 
open their borders to thousands of refugees.   
Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett also argued that national identity 
affects not only responses towards refugees but also most of the regional politics of 
the Middle East.  
Most nationals living in Arab countries in the Middle East view themselves 
as Arabs in addition to their main nationality. Shared Arab identity means shared 
language, history, and norms. Moreover, religion also plays a role in hosting 
refugees. This is obvious in the way Arab refugees settle in Lebanon; for example 
Christians stay in Christian areas and Muslims in Muslim areas.  
Telhami and Barnett also argue that an important trait of an Arab identity is 
hospitality, especially in the Levant. This explains why, at the beginning of the 
Syrian crisis, Lebanese citizens opened their homes to Syrian refugees until the latter 
found their own way of settlement.  
Constructivism does explain why Lebanon hosted refugees at the start of the 
crisis. However, with economic difficulties and security concerns constructivism 
fails in explaining why Lebanon continued to welcome and host Syrian refugees. It 
also doesn’t clarify the reasons why the Lebanese government changed its policies 
overtime, especially when policy of open borders came to an end in 2015.  
Liberalism on the other hand focuses on the role that international state 
system should play to cooperate with hosting states and help them bear the burden of 
refugees. It also asserts the role that hosting states should play in persuading other 
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states to send financial funds through international organization and non-
governmental ones.  
Emma Haddad is one of the authors who gave importance to the role of 
international institutions in binding states to a “mutual recognition of sovereignty, 
the belief in equality of all states, the principle of non-intervention and international 
law, which are commonly accepted by all states in the system” (Haddad 11). 
According to her, international institutions play a role in guarding these principles 
stressing the importance of human rights.  
Liberalism in general focuses on the benefits of working together and it’s 
usually the role of hosting state to persuade richer ones to aid in helping refugees. 
For example, Lebanon can warn of the possibility of radicalizing the refugees in case 
their needs were not met, or creating another wave of refugees’ exodus to Europe. 
Thus, this will affect the whole international security with the role that ISIS is now 
playing in the West. 
Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher explained the importance of cooperation 
between powerful states and weaker ones (North versus South) in the scope of 
international refugee regime, by what they called northern financial assistance. They 
also emphasized the importance of the ability of weaker state to convince powerful 
ones to provide funds and financial aids (Betts and Loescher 61-74). 
For liberals, the UNHCR acts as an organization that propagates human 
rights, refugees in particular, while providing temporal assistance until the refugees 
return to their homeland.  
With variables ranging between norms, shared identity, international 
organizations, and economic assistance from powerful state, the study of Syrian 
refugees’ dilemma in Lebanon, shall be based on an integrated theoretical approach, 
mixing between solutions provided by liberals and constructivists.  
Thus, this thesis will mainly refer to liberal school while studying possible 
recommendations to be applied by Lebanese state in order to help it deal with the 
economic and social burden of Syrian refugees on its host communities.  
 
1.4 Literature Review  
In addition to the above mentioned sources regarding the theoretical 
approach, other sources were considered to study the different hosting methods that 
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revolve around two systems: an open inclusive system that encourages integration 
and an exclusive system that encourages grouping refugees within camps. In his 
book Managing the Undesirables Michel Agier, divided the hosting models into a 
chronological order including self-organized refugees, sorting centers, spaces of 
confinement, and unprotected camps. In their book Transitional Settlements: 
Displaced Populations, Tom Corsellis and Antonella Vitale provided a roadmap for 
humanitarian organizations to help them manage refugees’ influx in what they called 
“transitional settlements”. In The Forgotten Solution: Local Integration for Refugees 
in Developing Countries, Karen Jacobsen wrote a detailed study about integration 
with local community, and the forms of hosting models that could guarantee that.  
To study the situation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, The researcher didn’t 
only count on previous research. The researcher conducted her own investigation by 
visiting camps in three different villages in Lebanon, meeting self-settled refugees, 
and Lebanese from hosting villages. This was complemented with academic articles, 
reports from UNHCR and other NGOs working with Syrian refugees for the past six 
years. The researcher also referred to The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon: the 
Double Tragedy of Refugees and Impacted Host Communities, a book that was 
published in 2016 concerning the issue of Syrian refugees in Lebanon.  
To study the situation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan many 
sources were used. In addition to UNRWA figures and UNHCR reports, the book 
Palestinians in Lebanon: Refugees Living with Long-term Displacement by Rebecca 
Roberts was the main source for studying Palestinians in Lebanon. Other sources 
included May Farah’s Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon: Worthy Lives in Unworthy 
Conditions, Luisa Gandolfo’s Palestinians in Jordan: The Politics of Identity, and 
other statistical studies.  
As for the solutions, the researcher concluded and gave recommendations 
based on comparing the situation of Palestinians in Jordan and Lebanon to the 
Syrians in Lebanon. Circumstances of Syrians in Jordan were also compared to 
Syrians in Lebanon. Additional sources were used to present practical steps on how 
to compensate for the local communities if informal settlements remained as they 
are.  Most of consulted literature did not offer a practical hosting model that suits 
Syrian refugees in Lebanon.  
Six years have passed since the Syrian crisis first erupted. Many human rights 
organizations conducted reports about the inhumane situation Syrian refugees have 
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been living in and how their rights have been abused in host societies. Nevertheless, 
few studies tackled the underdeveloped nature of these societies along with the 
security, economic, and social fears that have contributed in the deterioration of 
refugees’ situation. Even when this issue was tackled, such observation only focused 
on describing circumstances as they are, without providing a possible long term 
solution to the impasse, or by studying and suggesting an alternative hosting model 
that could be applied to Syrians in Lebanon.  
 
1.5 Conclusion  
This thesis is organized into five chapters, including this one. The second 
chapter explores the hosting methods that the international system usually resorts to 
when dealing with refugee crisis. There are many ways to organize hosting models, 
most of them are viewed in the concept of whether they hinder integration or 
encourage it; especially when integration is considered one of the most desirable 
durable solutions for refugees.  
The third chapter is a report on a trip to three Lebanese areas with different 
religious backgrounds: Al Marj, a Sunni village, Al Haleneyeh, a Shiite village, and 
Kherbet Kanafar a Christian one. This visit aimed to have a firsthand examination 
about the situation there: hosting methods of refugees, circumstances they are living 
in, situation of host community, in addition to the dilemma reflected in refugees 
suffering and host community fears.  The relation was the most hostile in Al Marj, 
the village which supported the Syrian revolution the most at the beginning of the 
crisis. On the other hand, locals in Kherbet Kanafar were benefiting from the services 
provided by refugees, although they complained about their huge number. In al 
Haleneyeh, it seems that limits were drawn from the beginning.  
Chapter four includes a historic background about Palestinian presence in 
Lebanon, in order to be used later on as a comparison with Syrian refugees’ 
experience in an attempt to avoid recurrent mistakes. It also includes a cross 
examination with Jordan that successfully handled the crisis of Palestinian refugees. 
This research shows that with respect to Palestinian refugee camps, Lebanon was the 
worst in building, managing, containing and controlling these camps in the region. It 
also shows that because of Lebanese discriminative rules, Palestinian refugees 
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neither integrated with the host community nor repatriated to their own home, 
although 70 years have passed since they first arrived to Lebanon.  
Based on above findings, the fifth chapter suggests possible solutions by 
taking the Palestinian experience into account. The solutions will range from using 
funds in long term projects to funding investment in refugees. It will also shed the 
light on each hosting model, and how each could benefit or harm both Lebanon and 
the Syrian refugees. It concludes with a realistic refugee-hosting model that suits the 
Syrian refugees and guarantees their rights, taking into consideration the fears of host 
community, while exploring the practical steps to implement it.  
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Chapter 2 
Hosting Models 
 
As a reporter covering the arrival of Syrian refugees into Wadi Khaled, the 
researcher was surprised how poor Lebanese villagers opened their homes to 
welcome refugees, who were illegally crossing the border between Syria and 
Lebanon at river of Nahr Al Kabir. The area was crowded with refugees; they were 
huddled in houses, schools, mosques, and any other space that could be turned into a 
temporary shelter.  
At the beginning of the crisis, the Lebanese government searched for and 
located refugees in public areas, such as small ad-hoc camps, school, and mosques. 
Locating refugees in public areas like schools is usually the method governments 
resort to at the beginning of refugee crisis.  As for accommodating refugees with 
families, it has been suggested as a hosting method that reinforces integration 
between refugees and local communities. These are only two simple examples of a 
wide range of hosting models that have been discussed by literature related to 
refugees and how to contain them.  
The views advocating host policies and strategies are many and diverse, but 
two broad theories are most relevant to our inquiry: an open inclusive system that 
incorporates refugees in the general population, against a more exclusive system 
based on grouping the refugees within internments and camps.   
 
Camps have become almost synonymous with the refugee experience yet 
they are surrounded by controversy. Some argue that although undesirable, 
refugee camps are sometimes the only practical way to assist refugee groups. 
Others maintain that there are almost always viable alternatives to camps 
such as self-settlement. Opponents of refugee camps believe that there is 
evidence that refugee camps are not good for anyone. Research has 
demonstrated how for social, economic, environmental and health reasons the 
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consequences of placing refugees in camps are often negative. Others argue 
that there is little empirical evidence to prove that self-settlement is better for 
refugees than an organized camp (Roberts 48).  
 
2.1 Forms of Hosting Models 
2.1.1 Gatherings in their Chronological Order  
Michel Agier, who visited seven camps in different countries in Africa, 
noticed in his book Managing the Undesirables that refugees nowadays are treated as 
undesirable populations unlike refugees of 1930s and 1950s. Refugees of present 
time are kept away from the masses, thus others would not know about their 
sufferings. He focused on camps as it was the scope of his study. He talked about 
four major types of gathering spaces.  
 
2.1.1.1 Self-Organized Refuges 
This is where refugees find their first refuge, it is considered as sites of rest 
“where people stop for a while always ready to leave… This form of cross border 
point with a low visibility from the viewpoint of the UN and humanitarian 
organizations, has parallels with other forms of gatherings, in particular so-called 
“self-settled” campsites” (Agier 41). These sites are not controlled by UNHCR.  
 
2.1.1.2 Sorting Centers 
They are similar to self-organized refuges in their temporal border location; 
however, they are under the control of official administrations like ministries of host 
country, police institutions, UN agencies and NGOs. These places are transit zones 
where names of refugees are recorded on files and are categorized for the cause of 
later redistribution.  
 
Whatever the continent on which they are found, these transit spaces are 
generally associated with practices of selection, expulsion, or admission, and 
with contexts of “flow management” that imply for those in movement a 
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more or less prolonged moment of immobility, waiting, and multiple 
constraints (Agier 47). 
 
2.1.1.3 Spaces of confinement 
Known by planned and official refugee camps. They are usually invisible to 
the masses as they are located in supervised separate locations. They may include 
less than 2000 individuals and may have as many as 200000 residents as it happened 
in Goma region in Republic of Congo between 1994 and 1996.  
 
As a general rule, camps are established on virgin land like a sudden and 
sometimes violent incursion into the local environment.  After first being 
installed in large tents, the refugees go on to construct around these collective 
tents huts and cabins out of mud-brick and wood, with roofs of thatch or 
plastified cloths, the material being generally provided by NGOs… At the 
same time, in a few months or anything up to a year, there is a gradual 
improvement of dirt roads, systems of water supply, latrines, septic tanks, as 
well as some public buildings (Agier 55). 
 
2.1.1.4 Unprotected reserves or camps for internally displaced persons.    
 
2.1.2 Grouped Settlements Vis-a-Vis Dispersed Settlements  
In their book Transitional Settlements: Displaced Populations, Tom Corsellis 
and Antonella Vitale tried to summarize the different types of hosting methods used 
in different refugee crises. The authors argue that bad planning of settlements can 
have a number of negative effects. It could, in a worst case scenario cause the 
destabilization of whole countries or even entire regions, like what happened in West 
Africa (Corsellis and Vitale 7). 
This book is an attempt to provide a roadmap for human organizations 
dealing with the issue of refugee influx and how to host refugees in what they called 
“transitional settlements”.  
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The term transitional settlement (TS) has been defined as settlement and 
shelter resulting from conflict and natural disasters, ranging from emergency 
response to durable solutions. The word originates from an approach which 
extends beyond the traditional response, with its limited focus on the 
provision of planned camps. The new approach considers the wider impacts 
of settlement and the options for settlement, emphasizing the need for a 
transition to durable settlement solutions and local development (Corsellis 
and Vitale 7). 
Before dissecting refugees’ hosting models, one should refer to UNHCR 
emergencies handbook that summarized what all sorts of shelters should provide to 
refugees in terms of security and safety.  
 
Shelter must, at a minimum, provide protection from the elements, space to 
live and store belongings, privacy and emotional security. Shelter is likely to 
be one of the most important determinants of general living conditions and is 
often one of the largest items of nonrecurring expenditure (Corsellis and 
Vitale 14). 
 
This is especially important to consider when resorting to camps as hosting 
model; especially that camps are usually built from scratch and are made specifically 
to contain refugees. According to Corsellis and Vitale, camps whether self-settled or 
planned, in addition to collective centers, fall under their category of grouped 
settlement.  
According to the two authors, the other forms of displaced settlements are 
grouped under dispersed settlements and include: accommodation with host families, 
rural self-settlement and urban self-settlement.  
Throughout their book, the authors showed their preference for the dispersed 
model arguing that: 
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 Support by the aid community for dispersed settlement can be practical, 
responsive, effective, and efficient, and compared with grouped settlement it 
can offer greater developmental benefits to the local population. Dispersed 
settlements may also pose a lower security risk than grouped settlements, 
because they do not offer an obvious target for attack (Corsellis and Vitale 
69). 
 
2.1.2.1 Grouped Settlements  
The authors defined each of their classification. Starting with grouped 
settlement, Corsellis and Vitale assured that a self-settled camp is when a displaced 
community may settle in camps, without any assistance from local government or aid 
community. The refugees usually settle these camps on a public land, after 
negotiations with the local population. Self-settled camps are usually established 
before the arrival of aid organizations. Refugees or displaced group choose this 
option hoping that it will drive external assistance later on (Corsellis and Vitale 115). 
In Lebanon one cannot refer to refugees’ gatherings as camps, for they still 
lack basic services that are usually found in camps. However, many refugees were 
self-settled in tents at the beginning of the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon. Later, 
they were sponsored by UNHCR and other non-governmental organizations. 
However, self-settled tents can still be found in Lebanon, especially on the borders 
between Lebanese Arsal and Syrian Qusayr. Planned camps on the other hand are 
more organized to meet refugees’ needs.  
 
Places where displaced populations find accommodation on purpose-built 
sites, and a full services infrastructure is provided, including water supply, 
food distribution, non-food item distribution, education, and healthcare, 
usually exclusively for the population of the site… Camps replicate an entire 
support system (Corsellis and Vitale 124). 
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In the case of planned camps, it is the responsibility of international 
community and host government to choose the location of the camp and usually 
without any rent expenses incurred.   
UNHCR consider camps as a last resort.  The main reason is that camps do 
not encourage refugees to depend on themselves, thus it will be difficult for UNHCR 
and other aid groups to gradually withdraw their assistance (Corsellis and Vitale 
124).   
The last form of grouped settlements according to Corsellis and Vitale is 
collective center. Refugees or displaced persons usually settle in pre-existing 
structures, like “community centers, town halls, gymnasiums, hotels, warehouses, 
disused factories, and unfinished buildings” (Corsellis and Vitale 105). Usually, 
these kinds of settlements are used at the beginning and only for a short period of 
time, until other form of accommodation can be arranged. 
 
2.1.2.2 Dispersed Settlements 
As for dispersed groups, they usually encourage integration between refugees 
and local communities hosting them.  To start with, rural self-settlement, according 
to Corsellis and Vitale starts when displaced people including refugees cross a 
border, stop at a village, and negotiate on the use of land. They will later use part of 
this land for agricultural aims.  
On the other hand, urban self-settlement is when displaced populations from 
urban background decide to settle in a town, occupying unclaimed properties or 
settling informally.  
Refugees, who are dispersed with host families, usually live with local 
families or on a land owned by them. Members of host family might be relatives or 
complete strangers. The displaced person may stay for free, pay rent, or work for that 
family in return. Aid organizations might sometimes offer incentives to local families 
in order to host refugees.  
In 2012, UNHCR provided statistics on location of refugees registered with 
UNHCR and whether they lived in urban areas, rural areas, or a mixed/unknown 
location. They also provided statistics concerning type of accommodation ranging 
from planned/managed camp, self-settled camp, collective centre, reception/ transit 
camp, individual accommodation (private), or undefined if the type was unclear.  
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Surprisingly UNHCR reported that 54% of refugees were living in individual 
accommodation. One-third of refugees were living in planned/managed refugee 
camps. Only 6% were living in self-settled camps and 4% in collective centers. 
UNHCR also reported that planned/managed refugee camps and self-settled camps 
were mainly found in rural areas, whereas individual accommodation was the 
prevailing type of residence in urban areas (UNHCR Global Trends 2012).   
 
2.1.3 Integrating the Refugees or Segregating them? 
Whether refugees are grouped or dispersed isn’t the only method to 
differentiate between settlements. Another important factor to consider is whether the 
method encourages integration with local society or hinders it.  
In a paper published by UNHCR, Karen Jacobsen wrote a detailed study 
about integration with local community. According to The Forgotten Solution: Local 
Integration for Refugees in Developing Countries, Western countries resort to 
integration, whereas developing or underdeveloped societies avoid this option.  
 
Many host governments, particularly in Africa, permitted refugees to settle 
amongst the local host community without official assistance – a practice 
known as self-settlement. However, the legal aspects of local integration, 
which require that refugees be granted full refugee status, permanent 
residency and other human and civil rights, were seldom granted by host 
governments in developing countries (The Forgotten Solution 2).  
 
Thus, forms of settlements that guarantee integration promote more rights and 
promise a greater legal status for refugees, unlike the other forms of settlements that 
insist on segregating the refugees. Nevertheless, Jacobsen noticed that even when 
refugees were integrated in developed countries it didn’t mean that their basic legal 
rights were always met.  
Additionally, the author talked about four kinds of settlements: self-
settlement, local settlement, fluid settlement and de-facto integration.  
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2.1.3.1 Self-settlement 
As previously discussed, self-settlement happens when refugees settle 
amongst the local community without any official help. Whereas assisted-settlement 
is when refugees are often helped by UNHCR, local governments or other NGOs. In 
rural areas it takes the forms of camps and local settlements, while it takes the form 
of mass shelters in urban areas.  Jacobsen defined camps as: 
 
 Purpose-built sites, usually close to the border, and in rural areas. For 
security reasons, UNHCR encourages camps to be built at least 50km from 
the border, but even when this regulation is complied with; camps are often in 
conflict zones. Since camps are intended to be temporary structures, they are 
seldom planned for long duration or population growth.  Dwelling structures 
are tents or flimsy huts, while water and sanitation infrastructure is 
problematic, especially over the long term. Camps are administered by 
UNHCR and host government (The Forgotten Solution 7). 
Jacobson and other scholars agree that camps are usually the form preferred 
by governments, as they facilitate repatriation due to their poor conditions, unlike 
UNHCR which calls for resorting to camps as the last option.  
 
2.1.3.2 Local settlements 
Also known as organized settlements. These are segregated villages created 
for refugees. Unlike camps, refugees in these types of settlements are expected to 
depend on themselves over time and become self-sufficient.  
Jacobson noticed that “local settlements have been widely used in Africa, 
especially Uganda, Tanzania and Sudan, as a response to protracted refugee 
situations and as an alternative to keeping refugees in camps.  But local settlements 
are not necessarily intended to enable local integration, and some suggest they are 
intended to prevent it” (The Forgotten Solution 7). 
This is because refugees in local settlements are denied freedom of movement 
and are not allowed to leave the area defined by local authorities.  
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The needs of hosting governments and donors usually play a role in setting 
the policy of local settlements. The goals might be either repatriation, or agricultural 
and economic development. In the first case, the needs of refugees will be met by 
international aid organizations until repatriation happens. In the second case, 
Jacobson gave the agricultural settlements of Uganda and Tanzania as an example 
where underutilized areas were developed by refugees.  
 
2.1.3.3 Fluid Settlement 
This is when settlements are seen as a fluid process in which refugees use 
different forms of settlements. For example, those who are self-settled at the 
beginning of their arrival might be moved to camps as authorities identify and check 
them.  The opposite might also be true where refugees in camps choose to leave the 
camps and self-settle within local community. A fluid settlement might also mean 
that a family chooses a camp as a household survival strategy, while male members 
leave the camps looking for jobs and would return to the camps when there is no job 
opportunity.  
 
2.1.3.4 De facto Integration  
It happens when self- settled refugees become unofficially integrated as time 
passes. They can usually financially support themselves by finding a job and can 
have access to education, health facilities, and housing, and then they might also 
become socially integrated with host community. Nevertheless, their legal status 
remains illegal and depending on the government they are either seen as guests, or as 
illegal immigrants.  
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2.1.4 Schmidt’s Differences between Camps and Settlements  
Dr. Anna Schmidt, in an academic research that was published by Forced 
Migration Organization, had a simpler categorization for refugees’ hosting models.  
Based on African refugee studies, she highlighted main differences between the 
camps and settlements. She summarized five parameters that differentiate between 
the two: the first is the freedom of movement that is restricted in a camp. It is 
followed by mode of assistance/economics where refugees living in a camp are 
prohibited from engaging in economic activity. Camps are also distinguished by 
parameters of control and mode of governance. Refugee camps are also considered 
as temporally shelters and are usually smaller than settlements, which are considered 
as a durable solution. 
Schmidt clarified that some scholars consider the approach of “assistance forms” 
while studying the categories of hosting models. Thus, she differentiates between 
planned and unplanned rural settlements where refugees rely on themselves in one way 
or another, and camps where refugees are fully assisted.  
To summarize the above, the majority of scholars generally discussed the same 
patterns of hosting models. However, each one used his own classifications to 
differentiate among them. Corsellis and Vitale divided what they called transitional 
settlements into two main categories: grouped settlements and dispersed settlements. 
The first consists of self-settled camps, planned camps, and collective centers. The 
second lies in accommodation with host families, rural self-settlement, and urban 
self-settlement.  
Karen Jacobsen differentiated between models that promote integration and 
those that encourage segregation. She divided her hosting models into four 
categories. Self-settlement takes place when refugees settle amongst the local 
community without any official help. Assisted-settlement is when refugees are often 
helped by UNHCR, local governments or other NGOs. They take the form of camps 
and local settlements in rural areas and the form of mass shelters in urban areas. 
Fluid settlement is when a refugee moves from one form of settlement into the other. 
As for Jacobsen’s fourth category, de-facto integration, it happens when time helps 
refugees to become integrated with local community, however, their legal status 
remains illegal.  
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As for Dr. Anna Schmidt, she simply talked about camps and settlements 
highlighting main differences among them especially what is allowed in a settlement 
and restricted in a camp and vice-versa.  
 
2.2 Hosting Models in Lebanon  
Whether you head north, south, east, or west, you will be surrounded with 
tents. This is how a trip into different Lebanese villages looks like. The situation 
hasn’t changed for the last six years. The story is the same, children, women, elderly, 
and men all living in tents that barely protect them from Lebanese hot summers and 
freezing and flooding winters.  
The scattered tents in different Lebanese areas are neither considered camps 
nor official settlements. UNHCR and other human aid organizations refer to them as 
informal settlements; not planned, not self-settled, but informal.   
According to a map released by UNHCR on December 2016, the refugee 
agency divided these informal settlements into two categories: settlements that 
include more than four tents and settlements that include less than four tents. The 
map clearly shows that these informal settlements are spread all over Lebanese areas, 
which hold different political or religious views, regardless of the fact that they are 
not equally distributed.  
The number of informal settlements that include more than four tents is 2244 
with 37,290 tents and 212,316 refugees. Baalbek is at the top of the list of this 
category, it includes 712 informal settlements with 74,383 refugees. Zahleh is second 
with 592 informal settlement and 69,153 refugees followed by West Bekaa with 206 
informal settlement and 25,276 refugees (Syrian Refugees in Lebanon).  
The number of informal settlements that include less than four tents is 2136 
with 3807 tents and 22,230 refugees. Zahleh tops this category with 483 informal 
settlements. Whereas each of Baabda and Bcharre include one informal settlement 
(Equity in Crisis Response).  
UNHCR also clarified that 81% of Syrian refugees rent their accommodation, 
including those who live in tents, with average rent price of 200 USD as monthly 
payment.  
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68% of all refugees are estimated to rent apartments, often sharing small 
basic lodgings with other refugee families in overcrowded conditions. The 
remaining 32% live in fragile environments such as tents in informal 
settlements, and sub-standard shelter including garages, worksites and 
unfinished buildings (Syrian Refugees in Lebanon). 
 
According to UNHCR, as the resources of refugees decrease they find 
themselves evacuated from the locations that they were paying for. Thus, UNHCR 
did provide a plan for hosting Syrian refugees, however, Lebanese government 
rejected this plan and both parties failed to reach an agreement.  
 
UNHCR and MOSA identified possible land for medium sized formal sites 
(10,000-20,000 persons), principally in the Bekaa Valley. These did not 
receive government approval. The Government policy in May 2014 called for 
camps in border areas which UNHCR cautioned is not advisable given that 
border areas are not secured by the Lebanese security forces, and that camps 
in such volatile areas could be used for rest and recuperation by armed 
fighters, for recruitment; be targeted by warring factions, aggravating 
insecurity already present in the border areas. Events in Arsal have borne this 
out (Syrian Refugees in Lebanon). 
 
Ironically, while UNHCR considers camps as the last option to host refugees, 
it offered them as a solution for Syrian refugees in Lebanon under certain criteria. 
However, even camps were rejected by the Lebanese government. The current 
alternative is thousands of informal settlements that are spread all over Lebanon, 
where refugees lack basic health and human requirements.  
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Chapter 3 
Syrian Refugees in Lebanon: A Field Study 
 
Informal settlements are obvious to anyone who visits rural areas in Lebanon. 
On the field visit to Bekaa, the researcher passed through hundreds of settlements 
that look to the passer as calm areas from the outside. However, a closer interaction 
reveals the chaos, over crowdedness, and the difficulties that the Syrian refugees, 
living in these tents, suffer from. According to 1951 convention, a refugee is any 
person who cannot return to his homeland.  
 
 Owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or 
who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, 
is unwilling to return to it (1951 convention).  
 
Although this is applicable to Syrian refugees whom the researcher met while 
conducting this study, nevertheless, these refugees, and as the years passed, gained a 
new characteristic. They became protracted refugees as they have been in Lebanon 
for six years. According to UNHCR, protracted refugees are populations of “25,000 
or more who have been in exile, in developing countries, for 5 years or more” 
(Protracted Refugee Situations 2).  
Syrians refugees, like other protracted refugees, looked devastated and 
unwilling to change the circumstances they are living in. The majority have been like 
this since they arrived to Lebanon. Others, instead of improving their circumstances, 
have lost many of their privileges and thus their circumstances have worsened.  
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Refugee situations that remain unresolved for an extended period of time 
create “protracted” or “warehoused” refugee groups for whom the initial 
experience of becoming a refugee develops into a way of life. Groups of 
people find themselves in a state of limbo subject to conditions over which 
they have little or no control and with few resources or rights to act 
independently to change their circumstances (Roberts 1). 
 
To have a look on protracted Syrian refugees, especially those living in 
informal settlements, the researcher visited three Lebanese villages in Bekaa: 
Kherbet Kanafar, Al Marj, and Al Haleneyeh.  These villages represent three areas of 
different sects welcoming Syrian refugees. Kherbet Kanafar is one of the very few 
Christian villages containing informal settlements. Usually Syrian refugees in 
Christian areas resort to renting houses, living in shops, or in extended houses 
belonging to families they work for. As for Al Marj, it is constituted of Sunni 
population whereas the Shiites inhabitants of Al Haleneyeh.   
 
3.1 Research Methodology  
Research was conducted in three visits to three camps in Lebanon during 
March 2017. Data was collected through open-ended interviews with focus groups of 
five individuals interviewed in each camp to ensure that the research is as accurate as 
it could be, with respect to limited time and resources contributed to the study. 
Additionally, information was collected informally through observation and casual 
conversations with other refugees. Interviews were conducted in Arabic. Questions 
were open-ended to decrease the influence on participants and to give them the 
chance to describe their ideas as freely as possible. Although, refugees were assured 
that the research should not endanger them and that their identity can remain 
anonymous if they wish to, however, some views might not have been expressed as 
fully as possible, for the below reason.   
As the researcher arrived to Bekaa, she found out that as a researcher, one can 
only have access to the camps by notifying the local municipality in each village. 
When the researcher informed the municipalities about the reason of her study, a 
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municipal police officer escorted her to the camps. Although, the researcher asked 
the municipality police to stay at distance from the interviewees as the interviews 
were conducted, the researcher believes that his presence disturbed the refugees, 
which might have affected the accuracy of their answers.    
The researcher also interviewed Lebanese inhabitants living or working in 
areas adjacent to the camps, to study the relation between both the Syrian refugees 
and Lebanese host communities.  
Fieldwork findings were supplemented with review of academic articles, 
reports from UNHCR, and other NGOs working with Syrian refugees for the past six 
years in addition to books issued related to the subject.  
  
3.2 Field Visit to Bekaa  
3.2.1 Al Marj 
In a crowded area which looked like a market for Al Marj village rests Al 
Hamdaneya camp, as Syrian refugees call it. The camp is surrounded by shops 
owned by Lebanese and sometimes rented by Syrian refugees, who started their own 
businesses in this Sunni village.  
As the researcher approached the shops, Mahmoud, a Lebanese in his late 
forties insisted on talking to her. “You want to know about the Syrians, I want to tell 
you about the Syrians.” He grabbed two chairs from his shop and as he sat with the 
researcher surrounded by a group of other Lebanese and Syrians.  
“The presence of Syrian refugees has affected every aspect of our lives; they 
are opening shops like our shops and selling their goods in cheaper prices risking our 
businesses. Our economic situation is deteriorating; this is killing us. Has not been 
for my children, I would have left this country. The Lebanese government is doing 
nothing to help me as a Lebanese. I pay taxes, they don’t.”1 
As Syrians stood silently, Bilal, another Lebanese man interfered. “The 
government had to control them from the beginning, not to act now after six years. 
They joined different occupations and they are working in almost every field. They 
are even renting lands and planting them. They go to the shop owner and offer him a 
rent higher than that paid by Lebanese, so the owner kicks out the Lebanese and 
gives his shop to the Syrian. As for the houses, two or three Syrian families live in 
                                                          
1 Yatim, Ghinwa. Personal interview. March 2017. 
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the same house and share the rent. The Lebanese cannot share his apartment with 
others although rents have increased due to the presence of Syrian refugees. Not only 
they don’t pay taxes, they don’t have to register their cars or pay any yearly payment 
tax or registration.”2  
Lebanese of this group insisted that Syrians pay nothing for Lebanese 
government. This includes their residencies, which they do not renew.  
The researcher looked at Syrians standing nearby and asked Wael “Is it right 
that you don’t pay taxes?” Before getting an answer, all Syrians who had joined the 
conversation silently left without commenting or refuting Lebanese claims. Wael 
answered that he is barely making money to live with his sister let alone paying taxes 
or renewing residencies. “When I first arrived I was registered with UNHCR, 
however, they later removed me from their refugee program. The Lebanese want us 
to work either in farming or constructions. When I worked as a constructor, Lebanese 
security arrested me and restrained me from working as I lacked legal documents. I 
opened this sweets shop because I was left with no other option.” When the 
researcher asked him where he got the money to rent this shop, “I borrowed money” 
he answered. 3 
Bilal aggressively told him “you are becoming like the Palestinians, a state 
within a state. If each of you threatened us with a stick you can harm us.” 
The researcher asked the Lebanese whether they have security fears or 
experienced any security threats. They assured her that nothing till now happened in 
their village, however they are afraid from security threats that the future might hold. 
She answered but when Syrians first arrived you welcomed, helped, and opened your 
houses for them. Mahmoud answered “we thought this will take only few months not 
six years, we are afraid that a day will come and they will force us out from our 
village.”4 
 
The relationship between host and guest usually begins in a friendly manner, 
but then becomes imbalanced when the visitor is forced to reside in another 
country and is unable to leave. The host becomes angry and is unable to 
                                                          
2 Yatim, Ghinwa. Personal interview. March 2017. 
3 Ibid 
4 Ibid 
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either tolerate the burden posed by the guest, or eject him. Over the long term 
this relationship becomes one of the strong versus the weak, forced to live in 
the same place. The visitor may not rebel against his host; if he does, he 
becomes an occupier and the host will exploit his position to pressure the 
guest, using all possible means, in the hope that he will finally be rid of him 
(Abu Hamed 8). 
 
At the end of the interview, Wael still described his relation with Lebanese 
neighbors as a good one.  
Despite what seemed like an aggressive mood by the Lebanese host 
community in Al Marj, things seemed calmer on the other side of the street, where 
Hamdaneya settlement rests. This settlement alone hosts over 800 refugees; it was 
built four years ago and includes 117 tents. Most of the refugees have been living 
there since they arrived. However, this was not the case for Fahed, who works as a 
doorman for a small school inside the settlement. He rented a house when he arrived 
from Syria three years ago. Unfortunately, he later had to move into a tent as he lost 
his savings. He works for ten hours a day and earns a monthly payment of $350 of 
which he pays $150 as rent for the area that his tent occupies in addition to electricity 
charges. During the summer he loses his monthly income. Fahed was the only 
refugee of all those the researcher has met in the three informal settlements who said 
that he would prefer to return to any area in Syria over staying in Lebanon if camps 
were built there. According to Fahed, the only problem with the host community is 
that Lebanese always blame them for things they have no control over. He agrees 
that some Syrians act with “undesirable attitude”, harming not only the Lebanese but 
also Syrian refugees themselves.  
All refugees in this camp built their own tents and that cost them around $800 
for each camp. Every year they pay almost $200 to repair damages caused by harsh 
winter circumstances.  
Shhadeh who is 65 years old and who serves as a guard in Hamdaneya 
settlement said that he gets food coupons from UNHCR. Nevertheless, sometimes he 
is obliged to sell these coupons to pay for his rent since he does not work.  
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Refugees in three settlements agree that all what they are getting from 
UNHCR are the food coupons. Other refugees, especially those who arrived after 
2014, are not even getting the food coupons, as they are not registered with UNHCR 
due to the ban enacted against new refugees enforced by Lebanese government.  
Hamdaneya refugees described their relation with the host community as a 
good one, they enjoy moving freely, yet they feel that they are a burden on Lebanese 
citizens especially that the Lebanese state is a weak state as they said.  
Alaa, an unemployed Lebanese who is married with children, agreed that 
Syrians became a burden. “My employer kicked me out a year ago and I was 
replaced by a Syrian employee because he takes less and doesn’t need any social 
security documents.”5 
Lebanese in Al Marj said that they are paying the price for helping the 
Syrians, when they first arrived and blamed international organizations, including 
UNHCR, for helping the Syrians and neglecting the needs of poor Lebanese. They 
are afraid from the future as Syrian children are not going to schools, wondering 
what will happen to future generations in case Syrians stayed in Lebanon.  
Al Marj isn’t a unique case. Refugees of the world are usually “perceived as a 
problem rather than people with problems so are genuinely rarely welcomed by the 
host country” (Roberts 28). They are usually considered as economic burden who 
also share limited natural resources and services becoming sometimes a threat to 
social stability especially that mostly underdeveloped countries host the big share of 
refugees according to UNHCR. 
 
3.2.2 Al Haleneyeh   
The relation between Syrian refugees and Lebanese host community in Al 
Haleneyeh seemed less aggressive than that of Al Marj. However, some of the 
Lebanese still blamed the refugees for their deteriorating economic situation.  
Sobheyeh who works as a tailor, sat calmly behind her sewing machine in a 
shop facing one of the camps in Haleneyeh. She said that before the arrival of Syrian 
refugees she was doing better at her job. A Syrian tailor opened a shop in a 
neighboring village and now Lebanese who used to come to her from that village go 
to him instead, although he charges them more than she does, as they prefer to go a 
                                                          
5 Yatim, Ghinwa. Personal interview. March 2017. 
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place nearby. Sobheyeh believes that some Lebanese harmed Syrian refugees the 
way some Syrian refugees harmed Lebanese. She doesn’t have security concerns, 
however, she added “yesterday Syrian refugees attacked a Lebanese man in a 
personal dispute, this is the kind of trouble I’m concerned about but I don’t think 
there would be major security threats.” 6 
Hussein, her old neighbor in an adjacent shop said “of course I’m not 
concerned about security threats, we have Hezbollah, and they keep everything under 
control.” Hussein added that refugees had no effect on his economic situation.  
Not only the Lebanese mentioned Hezbollah during the interviews in 
Haleneyeh, but also Syrian refugees talked about them. When the researcher asked a 
group of refugees about their relation with host community, a woman answered that 
Hezbollah members treat them well. The researcher clarified that she is not asking 
about Hezbollah but about the citizens she said we are on good terms with them as 
well.  
Doctora Aisha is a Syrian refugee who has been lately suspended from 
UNHCR although she lives alone with her mom. She said that the relation with the 
host community was not that bad, implying that some troubles existed. “It is okay 
though” she said.  However, she was interrupted by other refugees who said that the 
relation was good and she refused to give further comments.   
 Refugees here also pay the rents of their tents. Those who work, they work 
as farmers and they take an average of $10 per day although they work for long 
hours. They do not work on daily basis. Like other refugees, they suffer from 
economic, health, and social problems. In some cases, extended families live in the 
same tent so they can afford the rent. They all stressed that only those who are 
registered with UNHCR get food coupons, of which they said are better than nothing.   
All refugees interviewed in this camp preferred to remain in Lebanon until 
the war is totally over in Syria. They said that even if official camps were built in 
Syria, they feel safer in Lebanon and in Al Haleneyeh, because the people here are 
good to them. “It is true that we are overloaded with debts here, but we are safe” said 
Khaldeyeh. 
Despite what Syrians described as economic suffering, Lebanese in Al 
Haleneyeh like their counterparts in Al Marj blamed NGOs and UNHCR for helping 
                                                          
6 Ibid 
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Syrians alone without giving any assistance to the poor host communities in both 
villages.  
 
Refugees increase the competition in job market and host communities 
usually resent the attention and aid given to refugee communities. The 
immediate host community may be poor but rarely receives additional 
assistance because chronic problems fail to attract the same high levels of 
international concern as crisis situations (Roberts 46).  
 
That is why citizens of host communities might feel annoyed when it comes 
to aids, thinking that refugees might be having more privileges than they do. 
 
3.2.3 Kherbet Kanafar      
A very calm village in West Bekaa, Kherbet Kanafar is one of the few 
Christian areas in Lebanon that agreed to construct informal settlements for Syrian 
refugees. Nevertheless, as the researcher arrived to the municipality, she was told 
that all settlements that are spread in the village will be taken apart and one 
settlement will be built instead on an area owned by the municipality by the borders 
of Kherbet Kanafar. The reason behind that is locals’ discontent with the view of the 
settlements and the pollution they are causing to the environment around them. When 
set in distinct areas they wouldn’t be visible to Lebanese there.  
This was an issue of concern to the refugees whom the researcher met in 
Kherbet Kanafar. Thirty-seven years old Khaldeyeh told the researcher that she 
doesn’t want the municipality to change their location. “This means that we have to 
build our own tents all over again. It took me five years to organize this place. It 
costed me around $2000. Moving us means that we have to pay this over and over 
again” said Khaldeyeh. 
Khaldeyeh was alone in her tent. Her husband was harvesting in a nearby 
land. He earns almost $17 a day which is more than what Syrians earn in Al Marj 
and Al Haleneyeh, but like all Syrians he works for long hours in an unsteady 
manner.  
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Most of the tents visited in Kherbet Kanafar were empty, the researcher found 
only the housewives. Men were at work and children were at school.  
Aisha was also alone in her tent, which she considers her home. The family 
built a kitchen and a toilet inside the tent, unlike other settlements where refugees 
have to share bathrooms and showers. Aisha said that she doesn’t mingle a lot with 
the locals but her husband is on good terms with them. She said other Lebanese like 
her gynecologist treat her in a racist way. 
Aisha got two of her kids in Kherbet Kanafar; however, she had to go all the 
way to Zahlé to register them.  
Although refugees say that they are on good terms with the locals, they are 
currently facing two problems. The first one is reflected in their fear of moving their 
location to the borders of the village, which will cost them more money. The second 
problem is that those who give birth in Kherbet Kanafar have to go to different 
villages to register their babies.  
 
According to Statistics Lebanon LTD, Lebanon had 31,000 Syrian newborns 
in contrast to 72000 Lebanese newborns in 2013, when the number of Syrian 
Refugees was approximately 200000 in the beginning of 2013. Since the 
number of Syrian refugees has reached approximately 1.5 million, it is 
expected that the number of Syrian newborns in Lebanon will match or 
outnumber that of Lebanese newborns by the end of 2015 (Rabil 5) 
 
“We cannot register them in Kherbet Kanafar” according to Mayor Jamil 
No’eem. “We are afraid of future naturalization. If we registered them here, they will 
be considered as citizens of this village, which will mean a demographic change that 
we do not want.” 7 
Fear of naturalizing newborns was also reflected in statements of Lebanese 
officials. Lebanese minister of foreign affairs Gibran Basil not only opposed 
registering Syrian refugees, but also rejected to register Syrian newborns as it was 
                                                          
7  Yatim, Ghinwa. Personal interview. March 2017. 
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planned by UNHCR. “According to him registering Syrian newborns would be the 
beginning of their naturalization, which we have previously warned about” (Rabil 8). 
Also due to fear of naturalization, officials in Kherbet Kanafar refused 
UNHCR’s proposal of renting lands to build settlements. They prefer to keep the 
lands under their control so that they have the right to move refugees when they 
sense any problems.  
No’eem explained that they are on good terms with the Syrians. They are 
working in occupations that Lebanese workers in Kherbet Kanafar refuse to do, like 
farming, according to No’eem. “We cannot blame them for our economic problems. 
They don’t oblige us to employ them. If they leave, most of the Lebanese here won’t 
do their jobs. Syrians have always been living in our village. However, after the 
Syrian crisis they increased in number. That’s why we do not fear any security threat 
because of their presence” he said.  
Other Lebanese in Kherbet Kanafar were not as lenient as No’eem. Jean a 
Lebanese local said that some Lebanese wouldn’t mind doing what Syrians are 
doing, however, the low wages that Syrians accept put many Lebanese out of the job 
market.  
Around 1370 Syrian refugees live in Kherbet Kanafar, which is equal to the 
number of locals who live permanently in the village. This harmed the locals 
according to Jean. However, he doesn’t have any further fears.  
 
3.3 Hosting Model Preferred by Syrians vis-à-vis Lebanese  
Khaldeyeh, the Syrian refugee the researcher met in Kherbet Kanafar lives 
next to four of her siblings. She prefers this hosting model over being hosted in an 
official camp. Whether this camp was in Lebanon or Syria, she prefers to remain in 
an informal settlement despite her economic difficulties.  
“I don’t feel like going to any camp in Syria even if we got guarantees that 
we would not be hurt from the Syrian regime. Unless it is completely safe in Syria, I 
prefer to stay in Lebanon. It is safer here. As for moving into a camp inside Lebanon 
or on its borders, I would rather live next to my siblings, instead of living with a 
large number of total strangers. If anyone initiated any security threat in a camp, we 
will all pay the price. But here everyone is responsible for his own actions and the 
Lebanese know us by name” said Khaldeyeh.  
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All Syrians interviewed for the purpose of this study shared the same view. 
They all preferred informal settlements over official camps. Even Doctora, the Syrian 
refugee I met in Al Haleneyeh said that she preferred informal settlements, although 
she is not working and was suspended from UNHCR. “I prefer moving freely instead 
of being locked.” Others insisted on the possibility that the whole camp will be 
affected if any Syrian caused different sorts of troubles. According to them, each one 
is responsible for his actions in informal settlements.  
“Here although we live in a small settlement, we might face troubles with our 
neighbors. Any person might take advantage of small troubles in a camp and might 
cause problems for the whole camp if it was constructed. I prefer to live alone and 
with the help of God I can survive” said Aisha. 8 
On the other hand, “developing countries tend to have limited and already 
overstretched resources and are often heavily dependent on external assistance, so 
the presence of a refugee community is an additional burden” (Roberts 29).  
That’s why all the Lebanese that the researcher met to conduct this study 
agreed that it is better for Syrian refugees to be kept in camps. Some Lebanese talked 
about constructing the camps in safe areas, others said that these camps should be 
built in border areas. This would reduce economic and social problems as it was 
mentioned by Lebanese interviewees.   
Mayor Jamil No’eem said that “President Michael Aoun might visit Syria in 
June. He is expected to discuss the situation of Syrian refugees. There they will put 
conditions for taking back number of Syrians. After that, Lebanese can discuss what 
the best hosting model is for Syrians, depending on the number of Syrians who will 
stay in Lebanon.”  
Repatriation is a solution preferred by many Lebanese when it is possible.  
“Host countries are often poor, grappling with their own socio-economic problems, 
and would prefer a refugee population, regarded as a burden as well as security threat 
to be repatriated as soon as possible” (The State of the World’s Refugees).  
 
                                                          
8 Yatim, Ghinwa. Personal interview. March 2017. 
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3.4 Syrians and Lebanese: Two Sides of a Coin  
3.4.1 Syrian Suffering  
Based on what the researcher has encountered, the great majority of Syrian 
refugees prefer the hosting model of informal settlements in which they are currently 
living in, over official camps. Despite economic, health, and social difficulties, 
informal settlements provide the Syrians with freedom of movement and work unlike 
official camps that will restrict this sought freedom. On the other hand, the vast 
majority of the Lebanese met prefer restricting the presence of Syrian refugees in 
official camps to organize their presence and decrease the potential difficulties and 
inconvenience brought up by them. Some Lebanese talked about repatriation and the 
possibility of sending some refugees back to their country after an agreement is 
settled between Lebanese and Syrian officials. This possibility was rejected by most 
Syrians who took part in this study and described Lebanon as a safer place than 
Syria, explaining that they would not return unless a final peace settlement is reached 
in their country.  
Although Syrians remained positive about the relation with Lebanese, 
nevertheless they do suffer from racism in addition to their economic problems. “The 
version that many Syrians used to have about Lebanon and the Lebanese prior to the 
Syrian revolution hasn’t seen a big change, except that it remains hidden because of 
the current conditions” (Abu Hamed 8). 
Racism takes different forms in different Lebanese host communities. While 
in Shiite and Christian areas, Syrians are perceived and labeled as “the Sunnis”; in 
Sunni areas Syrians are blamed for leaving their country instead of staying there to 
fight their regime.  
 
The Syrians in the view of Lebanese Christians and Shiites form a “Sunni 
bloc,” which represents a dual problem. First, they aren’t Lebanese, but like 
the Palestinians in Lebanon they’re potential members of Lebanon’s Sunni 
sect. Today, the overwhelming majority of residents of Lebanon from all 
nationalities are Sunni, and this is expressed in different types and forms of 
sectarian awareness, much of which involves tension. This doesn’t take away 
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from the formation of a Sunni Lebanese negativity toward the refugees while 
there is the irony of the emergence of people who blame the Syrians for their 
revolution against the regime of Bashar Assad, there are those who blame 
them for not bringing down the regime. This feeds a general negativity, some 
of it of an offensive character, based on these two contradictory 
foundations… There are certainly feelings of racism against Syrian refugees 
(Saade 5). 
 
While Syrians can live within a racist atmosphere, they are more worried 
about their economic problems. One of the major problems that concern Syrian 
refugees is the amount of money that they are obliged to pay to renew their 
residencies. Whether they are registered with UNHCR or not, all Syrians have to pay 
$200 as yearly renewal fees.  
 
Human Rights Watch noticed that due to these regulations many Syrians lost 
the legal standing in Lebanon. To their surprise only two of forty refugees 
that HRW interviewed in 2015 were able to renew their residencies with their 
UNHCR certificates. Another two were denied their UNHCR certificate but 
were able to renew their residency with the help of a sponsor (Bobseine 1). 
 
This puts the Syrians at the risk of arrests and ill-treatment. It also restricted 
their freedom of movement fearing the possibility of being arrested. Most Syrian 
refugees cannot afford residency fees. According to UNHCR reports “70 percent of 
Syrian refugees in Lebanon fall below the poverty line relying on aid to survive; 90% 
are trapped in a vicious cycle of debt, according to a recent United Nations 
assessment” (Bobseine 2).  
Moreover, Lebanese government started a sponsorship program where 
Lebanese employers sponsor Syrian employees. This also put the Syrians under the 
mercy of their employers. Many Syrians reported that they were sexually harassed by 
their employers according to interviews that were conducted by HRW.  Over and 
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above, it is feared that this sponsorship system aims at turning refugees into 
“economic migrants” where it will be more “acceptable to force migrants back to 
Syria than refugees fleeing persecution. Humanitarian workers assisting Syrian 
refugees are afraid that authorities are re-categorizing refugees as migrants to 
facilitate their return to Syria in the future” (Bobseine 7). 
Although Lebanese citizens complain about losing their jobs for Syrian 
workers, nevertheless it is not easy for Syrians to find a job and most of those who 
do usually work illegally for long hours and small wages. “Those registered with 
UNHCR are prohibited from working in Lebanon and must sign a no-work 
agreement when they renew their residency, violation of which puts them at risk of 
arrest and deportation” (Bobseine 2). 
 
3.4.2 Lebanese Fears  
While Syrian refugees suffer from a lot of difficulties, one cannot overlook 
the threat that they unintentionally pose over the Lebanese host community.  
Although most of Lebanese interviewed in the study didn’t show any security 
fear caused by the presence of Syrian refugees in their villages; nevertheless, many 
times Syrian refuges paid the price of security attacks initiated by extremist groups 
like Al Nusra and Daesh. Refugees in Syrian settlements were physically attacked 
when Lebanese soldiers were abducted by both groups in 2014. Syrians were also 
attacked when explosions took place in areas controlled by Hezbollah killing and 
injuring hundreds of Lebanese civilians, even though the suicide bombers were not 
Syrians in many cases. 
 
As for terror in Lebanon, in reading the figures we find that this phenomenon 
isn’t Syrian, and there’s a lot of fear that it will be proven to be a Lebanese 
phenomenon. The largest number of terrorists is made up of Lebanese; they 
are the children of our society. They were trained by ISIS and Nusra, but the 
suicide bombers and terrorists aren’t outsiders. The ones who have been 
caught are moving around in Roumieh prison and elsewhere; the majority of 
the perpetrators are Lebanese and some of taken refuge in Palestinian refugee 
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camps in a flight from justice. Thus, we shouldn’t make connections or 
generalize when it comes to our accusations (Hajjar 2).  
 
Nevertheless, according to interviews conducted by HRW, “different 
international humanitarian workers from different areas in Lebanon like Akkar and 
Bekaa told Human Rights Watch that “they had received at least one report of armed 
groups exploiting the economic vulnerability of Syrian refugees to recruit followers” 
(Bobseine 4). 
There is also the fear of spillover of Syrian war into Lebanon especially that 
many Lebanese parties are supporting opposite warring Syrian groups. Attacking 
Arsal and trying to enter border towns like Al-Qaa and Ras-Baalbek generated 
feeling of insecurity among the people accusing refugees of sheltering extremist 
groups.  
On the other hand, March 14 supported Syrian opposition and their allies in 
Lebanon.  
 
Northern Lebanon, especially Tripoli and Akkar, has emerged as a hub for 
anti-Syrian activists. Armed groups and weapons flowed into Syria, 
spearheaded by Salafists. Make-shift hospitals and security zones were 
established to accommodate the Syrian opposition. When in May 2012 
Lebanon’s General security arrested Islamist Shadi Mawlawi on the grounds 
he was providing material support to Syrian rebels, deadly clashes and 
demonstrations erupted in northern Lebanon forcing the government to 
release Mawlawi, and as a result to reveal its appalling weakness. Eventually, 
in March 2013, Mawlawi was indicted, along with nine Salafists, by 
Lebanese authorities on the grounds that he belonged to an armed group and 
Al Nusra Front with the intention of carrying out terror acts and transferring 
weapons and bombs between Lebanon and Syria (Rabil 6). 
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Hezbollah on the other hand has publicly asserted its military involvement in 
Syria on the side of the Syrian regime to protect Lebanon from the jihadists as they 
claimed, “as well as to support the Syrian regime as an essential part of the 
Resistance and the anti-Israel rejectionist axis” (Rabil 6). 
On a separate note, according to the authors of Welfare of Syrian Refugees, a 
report that was published by WFP, UNHCR, and UNICEF in 2015, two-thirds of 
Syrian refugee children in Lebanon did not receive any education and 44% of all 
school-aged children have not attended school for at least one year.  
 
Such a large influx of young Syrian refugees with specific needs in terms of 
schooling, training skills, and employability poses serious challenges on the 
host communities’ populations, infrastructure, legal framework, and political 
systems. Institutions or certain facilities (education, health care) may not be 
set up to absorb such a large population that is so vastly different from the 
host communities’ populations. Increased attention is inevitable to assure that 
the long-term of both refugees and host communities are met with great care. 
(Verme et al. 51). 
 
Although Syrian refugees find it hard to work in Lebanon and most of them 
are illegal workers, nevertheless they compete with young uneducated Lebanese 
locals in rural communities.  
 
 Some areas of Lebanon had seen up to a 60% decrease in the wage rate for 
day labour. The World Bank estimated that by end–2014, some 170,000 
additional Lebanese will be pushed into poverty. … An additional 220,000–
324,000 Lebanese are expected to become unemployed … most of them 
unskilled youth which would about double the unemployment rate, to over 20 
percent (Thibos 4). 
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Moreover, on many occasions Lebanese officials claimed that Lebanon is 
unable to afford the increased demand in electricity, water, and sanitation.  
All the above has led to increased tensions between Syrian refugees and 
Lebanese host communities.  
 
Instances of animosity are often attributed to the perception of some local 
residents, many of whom face some of the same structural constraints as 
refugees, that Syrian refugees unfairly benefit from humanitarian aid while 
dragging down the living conditions and employment prospects of local 
residents (Thibos 4). 
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Chapter 4 
Palestinians between Lebanon and Jordan 
 
The Lebanese Government has been refusing to build camps for Syrian 
refugees. Its adamant position is based on its previous experience with building 
camps for the Palestinians, who fled into Lebanon almost seventy years ago. 
Lebanon is one of the neighboring countries that welcomed one of the oldest and 
largest refugee groups that is unique and different from all other refugee groups.  
Palestinians have their own UN agency, The United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency for the Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which takes 
on its account helping Palestinian refugees alone. Meanwhile, UNHCR helps all 
other refugees, including Syrians. While other refugees can benefit from three 
durable solutions: voluntary repatriation, assimilation, or resettlement in a third 
country, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 provides other solution 
for the Palestinians. “All Palestinians who wish to do so should be allowed to return 
home, and those who do not should be suitably compensated” (Roberts 5). 
Nevertheless, it is still almost impossible for most Palestinians to go back home.  
 
Palestinians are probably the most notable refugee group that does not fall 
under the UNHCR mandate. Palestinians, considered to be the oldest and 
often the single largest refugee group, form a unique refugee population. For 
historical and political reasons Palestinians have become separated from other 
refugee groups in international law and in terms of the assistance, and 
protection they receive. They are the only population to have been deprived 
of their nationality and the territory of their former state (Roberts 20). 
 
Between Palestinians in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, the latter group is 
believed to suffer from the harshest living conditions. This chapter provides a 
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historic overview of Palestinian presence in Lebanon, the restrictions they face, and 
the present situation that they are experiencing, in order to compare it with possible 
outcome of Syrian refugees’ presence in Lebanon in the coming years. This 
comparison also aims at finding possible lessons that Lebanese can learn from their 
experience with the Palestinians.  
Additionally, this chapter also summarizes the experience of Palestinians in 
Jordan, which is to a far extent better than that of their counterparts in Lebanon, 
despite the similarity of security threats at the beginning. During these years 
Palestinians tried to use both countries as a home base to fight Israel from.   
This comparison aims at exploring the reasons why Jordan succeeded at a 
time when Lebanon failed in embracing Palestinians throughout all these years, in an 
attempt to avoid repeating the same mistakes with Syrian refugees.  
 
4.1 Palestinians in Lebanon… A Historic Overview  
Palestinian refugees are considered a protracted refugee group. Like the 
Syrians, these groups are a cause for concern. “Warehousing is the practice of 
keeping refugees in protracted situations of restricted mobility, enforced idleness, 
and dependency—their lives on indefinite hold—in violation of their basic rights 
under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention” (Smith 38). 
  From the one million Palestinian refugees caused by the 1948 first Arab-
Israeli war, 100,000 fled to Lebanon. By mid-1950’s, 16 UNRWA official camps 
were built in Lebanon in addition to numerous other unofficial camps. 
Like Syrian refugees, when the Palestinians first arrived to Lebanon, many 
received help from ordinary Lebanese and were hosted in the homes of the Lebanese 
who either knew them or sympathized with them. Wealthier Palestinians or those 
who had families were able to live privately. As for many other Palestinians, they 
chose to settle within Lebanese communities to work and help their families. 
However, as the years passed they found it necessary to move to camps for their 
survival (Gorokhoff 316).  
At the beginning of the crisis, the situation between Lebanese and 
Palestinians was not as bad as it became in the years that followed. Palestinians 
enjoyed acceptable level of freedom of expression and little hostility, meanwhile the 
Lebanese government took steps to monitor and control their activities.  
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The establishment of official camps allowed the Lebanese to develop a 
system of state control in the camps which was rigorously imposed between 
1958 and 1969. The deliberate location of camps away from the Lebanon-
Israelis border also allowed the Lebanese army to secure the border and 
disperse the refugees into smaller, more easily controlled scattered groups 
(Roberts 78). 
 
However, this precarious peace was shaken by three events that took place 
during a short interval that changed the way how Palestinian refugees reacted to 
Israeli attacks: the Six-Day War, the Cairo Accords, and Black September. These 
incidents that took place between 1967 and 1970 had an effect on the status of the 
Palestinians in Lebanon and Jordan.  
After the Six-Day war, in which the Arab states lost West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, Palestinians thought it is important to turn into their own resistance groups like 
Fatah and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to fight Israel. More Palestinian 
refugees arrived to Lebanon after 1967 war, leading to additional guerillas’ activity 
in Lebanon. With the loss of West Bank and Gaza Strip, Palestinians turned to south 
Lebanon as a base and launched many attacks against Israel from there. As a 
consequence, Lebanon was subject to revengeful Israeli attacks. The Lebanese 
government decided to confront Palestinians but after several clashes the latter forced 
the Lebanese army out of camps. These events led to Cairo accords between 
Lebanese government and PLO, which allowed Palestinian autonomy in camps under 
the condition that Palestinians agree to recognize Lebanese sovereignty. The PLO 
was also allowed to establish military bases in south Lebanon under the condition of 
coordinating with Lebanese High Command. This step secured their guerilla 
activities; something that didn’t happen within any other Arab hosting country; thus 
distinguishing Palestinian experience in Lebanon. Although clashes continued 
between both groups, nevertheless PLO settled in Lebanon after it was expelled from 
Jordan due to Black September events (Roberts 80-82).   
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The Lebanese civil war in 1975 started with the Christian Phalangist 
massacre of 27 Palestinians in a bus. This divided the Lebanese, Muslim militias 
sided with Palestinian factions against right-wing groups led by Phalangists.  
Palestinian camps in Christian areas were the weakest point and were either attacked 
or besieged. Fatah joined the fighting and sided with PLO after the massacres that 
took place in refugee camps. Israel joined the scene and attacked Lebanon and 
occupied its southern villages in an attempt to destroy the PLO in 1978, and stop its 
attacks into northern Israel. However, it withdrew under the pressure of international 
community only to launch another full invasion in 1982 when it reached Beirut. 
Thousands of Lebanese and Palestinians were killed; several Palestinian camps were 
severely damaged. Although both parties reached a ceasefire and withdrew from 
Beirut, nevertheless, Israel broke the ceasefire by committing the Sabra and Shatila 
massacre using the Phalangists. Around 2400 Palestinians were killed (Roberts 82-
84). 
Not only Israel launched attacks against camps, Palestinians also suffered 
from camps wars with the Lebanese Shiite Amal movement during civil war.   
As the war ended, Palestinians were the main party to be blamed, as if 
Lebanese themselves had nothing to do with the war. The refugees became the 
scapegoat for this devastating war, and they are still paying its price. The camps that 
were destroyed were not rebuilt and instead of 16 camps, only 12 camps were left in 
Lebanon nowadays that vary in size, from containing few hundred to 50,000.  
 
As many scholars have established, that Lebanon has been the host country 
that has been the most hostile to –and imposed the most restrictions on- the 
Palestinian refugees. Lebanon has not ratified “the Convention Relating to the 
Status of refugees (1951) or the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 
(1967), and extends no special treatment to refugees. Partly because of these 
restrictions, and partly because of the Palestinians active involvement in 
Lebanon’s civil war and frequent Israeli incursions, the refugees experience 
in Lebanon is unparalleled; even after six decades, Palestinian refugees are 
still regarded as foreigners (Farah 280). 
44 
 
 
“There are three groups of Palestinians in Lebanon: registered refugees, non-
registered refugees and non-identified refugees. Registered refugees are 
registered with UNRWA and the Lebanese authorities… This group is 
entitled to UNRWA services. Non-registered refugees, who number around 
35,000, are those registered only with the Lebanese authorities and not with 
UNRWA; they are able to access some UNRWA services. Non-identified 
refugees number around 5,000. They are in the country illegally and are not 
entitled to UNRWA services and receive no assistance from the government” 
(Roberts 94).   
 
Nevertheless, the exact size of Palestinian population is unknown. However, 
UNRWA provides approximate figures of registered refugees.  
 
Some 450,000 refugees are registered with UNRWA in Lebanon, with many 
living in the country’s 12 refugee camps. Palestine refugees represent an 
estimated ten per cent of the population of Lebanon. Around 53 per cent of 
the Palestine refugees in Lebanon live in the 12 recognized Palestine refugee 
camps, all of which suffer from serious problems (Where we Work). 
 
4.1.1 Repressing the Palestinians in Lebanon  
Since the end of Lebanese civil war, the relation between Palestinians and 
their Lebanese host community remained hostile. The Lebanese blame Palestinian 
refugees for both: the civil war and Israeli attacks.  Indeed, Lebanese especially right 
wing Christian parties and their supporters, blame Palestinians for Israeli military 
attacks against their country as a result of cross-border violence between Palestinians 
and Israelis.  
On the other hand “the Lebanese government regards the Palestinian as a 
destabilizing factor in an already unstable country and pursues anti-Palestinian 
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policies. It has gained popular support for its stance by concentrating the blame for 
the civil war on the Palestinians” (Roberts 8).  
Palestinians in Lebanon are among the most underprivileged groups of 
Palestinians in the region and they highly rely on UNRWA, at a time when the level 
of support they receive is decreasing with time. For a long period, they were 
restricted from working in 70 professions, they lack the freedom of movement, right 
of owning property, and they have no access to state schools and medical facilities.  
 
As a result of government policies that discriminate against Palestinians in 
Lebanon, UNRWA claims that Lebanon has the highest percentage of 
Palestinian refugees who are living in abject poverty and who are registered 
with the Agency’s “special hardship” programs of all its five areas of 
operation (Roberts 7). 
 
These discriminative policies affect every single aspect of refugees’ lives 
who could not improve their situation, despite the fact that they have been in 
Lebanon for seventy years. They still live in shelters that were supposed to be 
temporary. The camps are overcrowded and contaminated, and their inhabitants 
suffer from poverty, debt, and unemployment.  
“The living conditions in all camps are poor. There is severe overcrowding, a 
lack of privacy and natural light, unsanitary conditions and in adequate housing and 
infrastructure” (Roberts 103). That is why refugees in these camps refer to 
themselves as “the forgotten people”.  
Palestinians are not only restricted from owning any property on Lebanese 
territories, despite the fact that other foreigners can, Palestinians are also not allowed 
to increase the area of their camps or build new ones. 
In the south for example “the government maintains tight control over the 
camps, monitors all Palestinian activities, forbids building materials entering the 
camps freely, and strictly imposes all laws referring to Palestinians” (Roberts 10).  
Four of their camps were completely destroyed during the civil war and they 
could not replace them, including Tal al Za’atar. That mentioned, population growth, 
has also made present camps overcrowded. Lebanon, in comparison to neighboring 
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countries has the largest percentage of Palestinians living in camps, around 53% of 
them according to UNRWA. Palestinians find themselves obliged to remain in camps 
because of poverty caused by restrictions on employment, thus they cannot offer to 
live outside their camps due to high rents (Roberts 35).  
 
Despite having lived in Lebanon for 60 years, or having been born there, 
most Palestinians have been unable to obtain citizenship. Without citizenship, 
Palestinians are considered foreigners, and as such have been barred from 72 
professions. In 2005 the rules were relaxed and so Palestinians were barred 
from only 20 professions which still included engineering, medicine, and 
law… according to UNRWA, unemployment among the Palestinians in 
camps in 2008 exceeded 60% (Roberts 100). 
 
Palestinians, nevertheless, can work illegally in any profession if they find an 
employer who agrees to employ them; however, they will be paid less than their 
Lebanese counterparts.   
As for citizenship, it is agreed that if Palestinians were to be granted the 
citizenship, they will challenge the Lebanese demographic stability as the majority of 
them are Sunni. Thus, Palestinian integration might cause a threat to country’s 
sectarian balance and division of power. Yet, this did not stop the Lebanese from 
granting Christian Palestinians the citizenship as they arrived to Lebanon.  
Most Palestinians in Lebanon were born as refugees and were denied their 
basic rights and lived in hard economic conditions inside camps, which can mostly 
be accessible via showing the identity documents due to heavy military presence 
around the camps. All these conditions not only made Palestinians a poor population 
but also left them in debt. UNRWA reports that Palestinians in Lebanon is the group 
that depends the most on external assistance in a country where their students can 
only access UNRWA schools. Hence, this created a dependency culture. Assistance 
that Palestinian refugees get from UNRWA and other NGOs might improve their 
living conditions inside the camps and provide them with better economic 
opportunities; however, it demoralizes them on the social and psychological level, 
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hindering them from trying to find better alternatives and social and economic 
advancement.  
 
Lebanese policies aim at showing “the international community that the 
Palestinians can never be settled permanently in Lebanon because they 
threaten internal stability, and second to reduce the size of the population 
through imposing restrictions that impede daily life to the extent that 
Palestinians are compelled to leave Lebanon. These policies have led to a 
warehousing of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, which means that they are 
denied basic rights including freedom of movement and the right to work, 
forcing many to rely on external assistance for survival (Roberts 89). 
 
Over and above, the presence of numerous numbers of NGOs, UNRWA, in 
addition to the fact that the camps lack a central leadership and unified representation 
since PLO’s withdrawal in 1982, led to a diffusion of power. Camp inhabitants 
complain about the absence of structure and good governance that undermines their 
ability of improvement (Roberts 149).  
 
Contemporary Palestinian communities in camps in Lebanon exist without a 
formal system of governance. The lack of governance has negative effects on 
all aspects of camp life, and threatens the daily lives of the vast majority of 
camp inhabitants whose primary concerns are domestic. Governance refers to 
the existence of recognized and accepted institutions that exercise authority 
and control within agreed spheres of public and private life and are 
accountable for civil society. International bodies such as the World Bank 
and United Nations Development program (UNDP) argue that sustainable 
development and stability cannot be achieved without good governance 
(Roberts 165). 
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This has rendered a hostile relationship between Palestinians and Lebanese 
which affects the coping mechanism of the Palestinians, who despite the 70 years 
that they have spent in Lebanon, still long for going to a home of which most have 
not physically encountered. Moreover, “host community does not disguise its 
animosity towards the Palestinians. This creates a feeling of isolation among the 
Palestinians in the camps and some prefer to remain in the camps for long periods 
because they fear for their safety outside” (Roberts 152). 
Through its strict policies, the Lebanese government claims that it is 
protecting Palestinian right of return and is signaling to the international community 
that naturalizing the Palestinians would not be possible in Lebanon.  
Additionally, May Farah, in Diasporas of The Modern Middle East, wrote a 
research paper about feeling of belonging with respect to Palestinian refugees living 
in Lebanon. Based on her case study she noticed that refugees living in camps lacked 
any sense of belonging to Lebanon even if they were born and raised in Lebanon. 
However, those living outside camps and sharing poor neighborhoods with the 
Lebanese did not wish to return to Palestine and had stronger feelings of belonging 
despite the fact that they lacked basic rights.  
Moreover, Falling Behind is a report that was conducted by Age A. Tiltnes. 
This report summarizes the living conditions of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon 
based on a survey that was conducted in 1999 and its results were published in 2001. 
The report noticed that households which have managed to settle outside camps and 
gatherings tend to be better off than those that have not.  
It also showed that Lebanese restrictions forced Palestinians to take 
advantage of any chance to leave Lebanon. Indeed, Palestinians in Lebanon migrate 
to Europe more than Palestinians elsewhere. In Germany 80% of the 80,000 
Palestinians there came from Lebanon. According to the study “motivation to leave 
is better economic opportunities and a decent standard of living. Migration is also 
seen as a means to get away from social exclusion, and obtain civil and human 
rights” (Tiltnes 14). 
Scholars agree that it is the discriminatory practices of Lebanese government 
that prevent Palestinians living in camps from fully integrating.  
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“Despite –or thanks to- being denied the most basic economic and political 
rights and enduring the harsh conditions of life in refugee camps, the Palestinian 
refugees continue to embrace and assert their identity as Palestinian” (Farah 286).  
 
4.2 Palestinians in Jordan… Historic Overview  
Despite the fact that Jordan almost had same security threats initiated by the 
Palestinians, nevertheless, it succeeded in containing them and in bonding refugees 
with the Jordanian host community. A larger percentage of Palestinians in Jordan is 
integrated with the society than in Lebanon.  
The first presence of Palestinians in Jordan dates back to the 1920s when 
British authorities divided the region creating the Emirate of Transjordan. However, 
this chapter focuses on the presence of Palestinians in Jordan after 1940s, mainly 
after the creation of state of Israel.  
In 1948 population of “Transjordan” was around 450,000. With the arrival of 
first wave of Palestinians, it changed radically with the addition of 900,000 of whom 
at least half were considered as refugees. Original inhabitants of Transjordan were 
Bedouins, unlike the Palestinians who were more advanced on different levels, from 
education to employment, trade, and health care. Unlike the Lebanese, the native 
citizens of Transjordan were enthusiastic about containing the Palestinians, but it was 
the latter that were reluctant to the possibility of integration with a monarchy 
(Gandolfo 2). 
In 1949, King Abdullah’s desire to absorb the refugees and improve the 
position of Palestinians was reflected by adopting a law that enabled Palestinians to 
gain a Jordanian passport and later Jordanian nationality (Gandolfo 8).  
The relation between Palestinians and Jordanians was disturbed by the idea of 
State of Israel and the fear that Palestinians might lose their homeland for good. 
While Jordan tried to contain Palestinians and be the only Arab state to naturalize 
them, Palestinians have always perceived Jordan as a place to use to fight for taking 
their lands back.  
The year 1951 witnessed deterioration for the peaceful presence of 
Palestinians in Jordan. It was marked first by the assassination of Lebanese Prime 
Minister Riad Al Solh in Amman by a member of Syrian National Party followed by 
the assassination of King Abdullah in Jerusalem.  
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In 1964, the Arab league created Palestinian Liberation Organization, under 
Egyptian control and its faction joined Egyptian, Jordanian, Iraqi, and Syrian army. 
Jordan however remained cautious about it (Gandolfo 12). By 1970, PLO created a 
quasi-autonomous administration in Jordan causing clashes with Jordanian army and 
posing a threat to Jordanian sovereignty and Kingdom’s stability. This was topped by 
the utilization of Jordanian territory to attack Israel, presenting a threat to internal 
security. 
Despite these events, Jordan didn’t close its doors in front of additional 
Palestinian refugees. In 1967 after Israeli annexation of West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
140,000 additional Palestinians were registered with UNRWA after ‘an Naksah’ six 
day war. “The impact was to be lasting: by 1999 Jordan was host to 1.52 million 
Palestinian refugees, 4325 seeking UNHCR refugee status and a further 800,000 
displaced persons” (Gandolfo 9).  Today 2000000 Palestinian refugees live in Jordan, 
of whom most have Jordanian citizenship.  
For Arafat, Jordan became a battle field. In September 1970 Palestinians 
hijacked 5 airplanes, three of them landed in Zarqa with 600 hostages. King Hussein 
was humiliated on the international stage. He then took the decision to attack the 
Fedayeen. Black September drew a new line of alliance; Syria and Iraq supporting 
Palestinian fighters and Jordan and Israel in opposition.  
“For Israel, intervention had become a necessity, for had Jordan fallen to the 
Syrian army or Palestinian fighters the threat to the Israeli state would have edged 
closer” (Gandolfo 34).  
Black September caused distrust that led to denials of citizenship rights, 
healthcare, and education, security was strengthened around refugee camps and 
Palestinians related to radical leftist groups were arrested.  
In brief, due to the attempt to overthrow King Hussein, assassination of Prime 
Minster Wasfi Tal, in addition to other assassinations in London, and the events of 
Black September, the PLO was exiled to Lebanon.  
 
Palestinian refugees in Jordan are divided into 3 types: 
 
While the pre-1948 residents identify themselves as Jordanian and thrive 
commercially, professionally, and politically, the post-1948 refugees did not 
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live in camps and constitute the “silent minority”, though they have enjoyed 
equal success in terms of integration. Resentment persists amidst the refugees 
of 1967 and 1990-1991, as a high proportion of refugees of 1967 remain in 
the camps disgruntled, unsettled, despondent, militant or potentially so 
(Gandolfo 9). 
 
4.2.1 Palestinian Rights in Jordan  
The first step to contain Palestinian refugees was by granting them 
citizenship. It was followed by parliamentary representation in the lower elected 
chamber of deputies.  
Transjordanian nationality dates back to the 1920s where according to British 
mandate the Transjordanian nationality law stated that any “person who had his usual 
place of residence in Transjordan for the period of twelve months preceding the sixth 
day of August 1924” (Gandolfo 44). 
In 1954, this law was amended into Jordanian Nationality law which adapted 
a legislation to include Palestinian refugees “anyone carrying Palestinian passport 
issued before 15 May 1948 – provided that he is not Jewish- and habitually residing 
in Jordan during the period of 20 December -16 February 1954” (Gandolfo 45). 
The law also mentioned that “An Arab who resides in Jordan and has resided 
there for 15 consecutive years has the right to acquire Jordanian nationality, provided 
that he gives up his original nationality in accordance with his country’s laws” 
(Gandolfo 47). Moreover, after acquiring nationality, applicant should wait for 12 
more years to be granted positions in public sector including becoming a candidate 
for elections in Majlis Al Nowab (Gandolfo 48).  
In 1949, the Additional Law 56 provided Palestinians with a passport 
facilitating the movement of refuges into other countries looking for business 
opportunities. The passport issued aimed at calming an expanding population after 
annexation of West Bank in 1948 (Gandolfo 51). 
In 1988 King Hussein announced the dismantling of the legal and 
administrative links between the two areas affecting citizenship status and identity of 
West Bankers. Although King Hussein wanted to look like acting upon Palestinian 
desire after 1987 Intifada, Gandolfo notices Jordan used it as an excuse. 
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Given the demographic imbalance between the Palestinian and Jordanian 
components of the population, the intifada exposed Jordan’s vulnerability and 
provided a golden opportunity to flee the growing Palestinian unrest and 
prevent a spread of the discontent to Jordan (Gandolfo 61). 
 
Jordan continued to issue Jordanian Passports to Palestinians in the West 
Bank. However, Palestinians from West Bank or Gaza living in Jordan with a 
temporary passport are not allowed to benefit from free health care and as for 
education they are supposed to compete on 5% of seats dedicated for Arab foreigners 
(Gandolfo 67). 
In addition to temporary passports; green, blue, pink and yellow cards 
differentiated between Palestinians living in Jordan. The holders of each enjoy 
different levels of rights.  
 
4.3 Palestinians in Jordan… A hybrid Identity  
In her book Palestinians in Jordan, Luisa Gandolfo elaborated how 
Palestinians sustained their original Palestinian identity even when they became 
Jordanians causing sometimes a sort of clash of identities between both groups. 
However, they maintained a hybrid identity embracing both the al-qawmiyya of the 
Palestinian movement and Jordanian al-wataniyya. 
“A hybrid ideology has emerged that enabled the Palestinian-Jordanians to 
retain their longing for Palestinian statehood while demonstrating individual 
belonging to Jordan, thereby facilitating integration within Jordanian society” 
(Gandolfo 81). 
Palestinian identity realizes Palestine as a viable state where as Jordanian 
identity legitimizes the “presence of Jordanian populace as the host, owners, and 
leaders of the kingdom” (Gandolfo 85). 
“Although many are considered de jure Jordanian citizens, the desire for a 
homeland of their own kept the Palestinian refugees from forging a sense of 
Jordanian national identity, rendering Jordan forever the host state and never the 
homeland” (Gandolfo 94). This was partly caused by the conditions of Palestinians in 
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camps where Jordan state gave an excuse for its awful conditions by saying that a 
camp shouldn’t be a comfortable alternative to homeland (Gandolfo 95).  
Gandolfo recognizes that socio-economic differences affect Palestinian 
identity in diaspora stating that Palestinian Jordanians like Palestinians elsewhere 
experience discrimination and abrogation of their rights as citizens (denial of full 
schooling, exclusionary clauses of electoral law…). Nevertheless, according to 
FAFO report, refugees in Jordan have the best access to health services. In Lebanon, 
refugees rely mainly on UNRWA and NGOs for medical assistance. In this aspect, 
the report concluded “refugees are less satisfied with local medical facilities than 
refugees in Jordan and Syria” (Tiltnes 22). 
 
4.3.1 Integration of Palestinians in Jordan 
There are three types of Palestinians living in Jordan, each integrated within 
the Jordanian society in a different pattern. They were definitely affected by their 
socio-economic status.  
 
4.3.1.1The elite 
Palestinian diverse social category that was integrated with Jordanian elite of 
high ranking government and military officers. Their social integration and financial 
security came on the expense of their “Palestinianess”. 
 
4.3.1.2 Middle class 
The members of this group reestablished their businesses in new country 
arriving as small merchants who developed and progressed. This helped decrease 
their hostility to host society as years passed.  
 
4.3.1.3 Inhabitants of refugee camps who are still hostile to their host community  
For the people of the Gaza Camp it’s the worst because it’s even difficult to 
find a job, travel, and have proper documents or to attend universities and schools. 
These people are totally Palestinians. Those who have good businesses and are 
involved in political life are even more integrated in the society and they are not the 
same at all (Gandolfo 175).  
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For the middle class and elite, who have worked fastidiously during the last 
sixty years to re-establish their lives, both economically and socially, the 
prospect of leaving behind friends, schools, jobs, and a home is generally less 
appealing. For the inhabitants of refugee camps, however, life never settled 
completely. They are merely a population anticipating the imminent arrival of 
their homeland, to which they would return to, regardless of the conditions 
(Gandolfo 195). 
 
4.4 Comparative Conclusion  
 
It is generally accepted that for much of the time following 1948, Palestinians 
in Lebanon have had a worse position than those in any of the other UNRWA 
fields. In Jordan, the majority of Palestinians is entitled to full citizenship and 
therefor enjoys the same rights as Jordanian citizens… Palestinians who came 
from the Gaza strip in 1967 have only temporary passports. The Jordanian 
state has, for the most of the last 60 years, sustained reasonable relations with 
the Palestinians. Only 18% of the almost 1.9 million Palestinian refugees in 
Jordan live in camps (Roberts 30). 
 
This small percentage lives in ten camps spread all over Jordan. Despite all 
security threats imposed by Palestinians, Jordan did not treat all of them in the same 
way. Categorizing Palestinians helped Jordan embrace large number of refugees 
keeping in mind the welfare of Jordanian kingdom. Unlike Lebanon, where it is 
believed that the discriminatory policies set by the state are not only the reason for 
Palestinian suffering but also for the hostile relations between both groups. Such 
conditions continue to prevail despite the seventy years which have passed since the 
Palestinian presence in Lebanon.  
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In the next chapter, we will use the Palestinian experience in Lebanon and 
Jordan as an opening to draw possible solutions for Syrian refugees’ crisis and to 
avoid repeating the same mistakes especially with the Lebanese case, benefiting from 
the Jordanian experience.  
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Chapter 5 
Possible Solutions 
 
In the previous chapter we discussed how and why Lebanon failed in 
containing the Palestinians who suffer the most in comparison with their counterparts 
in the region. This chapter will shed the light on the pitfalls that caused this suffering 
which alienated the refugees although they have been in Lebanon for the past 70 
years. Comparing Palestinian experience with Syrian one aims at avoiding repeating 
same mistakes, knowing that making the refugees suffer does not mean accelerating 
their return to their homeland.   
 
5.1 Lessons Learnt from Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon  
Both Syrians and Palestinians were welcomed when they first arrived and 
both enjoyed many freedoms. During her coverage for Al Arabiya News Channel, 
the researcher used to meet injured soldiers from Free Syrian Army (Jeish al Hor) in 
Lebanese regions opposing Hezbollah in the north at the beginning of the crisis. Its 
members used to openly express their willingness to not only overthrow Syrian 
regime but also to fight Hezbollah inside Lebanon without taking into consideration 
the fact that they were being treated in Lebanon. They were supported by Lebanese 
groups who were later involved in the fighting inside Syria simultaneously as 
Hezbollah joined the Syrian war supporting the Assad regime. This looks more or 
less like the case when Muslim militias saw in PLO their savior and sided with it at 
the beginning of Lebanese civil war. The first mistake that Lebanese repeated with 
both Palestinians and Syrians is that they got overwhelmed by the causes of both 
groups and became part of their struggle, seeing them as the rescuer from whom they 
consider “the other” Lebanese instead of drawing limits and helping them solely on a 
humanitarian level.  
As the Lebanese state refuses to build official camps to host Syrians, one 
should keep in mind that Lebanese succeeded between 1958 and 1969 in controlling 
the Palestinian camps that were built away from the borders because they were easily 
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scattered. After the civil war and after PLO expelled the Lebanese army from the 
camps, it is the Lebanese state that made it acceptable for Palestinians to practice 
their autonomy in the camps according to Cairo accords. Till now Lebanese state and 
army are not allowed to enter Palestinian camps. Thus, Lebanon can succeed in 
controlling the Syrian camps like they did it with Palestinian ones prior to 1969 if the 
government wishes to, as long as it avoids signing agreements that legalize Syrian 
autonomy over their camps. On the other hand, Palestinian camps were the weakest 
link when some of them were attacked and damaged during the civil war and Israeli 
invasion, killing thousands of Palestinians. Moreover, Lebanon provides the worst 
example for hosting camps in the region. The living situation in Palestinian camps 
located all over Lebanon is disastrous. Roberts describes life in three different 
camps. One of them is Bourj al-Barajneh which is, despite UMRWA’s effort to 
undertake pest control, and maintain sewage systems and water supplies, “always 
dirty and home to many undernourished stray cats, oversized rats and cockroaches… 
The sewage system, which was connected to the municipal network in early 1990’s, 
is inadequate, and regularly overflows covering the streets in untreated sewage” 
(Roberts 125).   
Camps should be avoided on the long run as they turned out to be a bad 
solution for both Palestinians and Lebanese and the same will most probably happen 
with Syrians. However, the Lebanese state should participate in any future hosting 
model used to host the Syrians in order to keep security threats under control. 
Appropriate humanitarian and security intervention at an earlier stage helps in 
avoiding future problems. 
On the security level, at the beginning of the Syrian crisis Lebanese border 
villages suffered from rocket attacks initiated by Syrian army killing Lebanese 
civilians. The Syrian army claimed that these attacks came as a response to actions of 
Syrian opposition through Lebanese border. Nevertheless, the Lebanese state 
succeeded in controlling the borders and in containing the security threat; something 
it failed to do with Palestinians who used its borders to attack Israel putting Lebanon 
under revengeful Israeli attacks. Moreover, PLO was allowed to establish military 
bases in the south according to Cairo accords, giving it an official blessing for 
guerilla activities; something that didn’t happen with the Syrians.  
Seventy years have passed and the relation between Palestinians and 
Lebanese is still hostile. The suffering of Palestinians did not facilitate their 
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repatriation to Palestine, as it is argued by Lebanese state. They still rely on 
UNRWA due to the lack of legal status that gives them proper work permit despite 
the fact that a whole generation by now has been born in Lebanon. They are still 
living in shelters that were temporal, and in overcrowded camps suffering from 
poverty, debt, and unemployment. These discriminative policies prevented 
Palestinians from integrating with the Lebanese after all these years.  
 
The exclusion of the Palestinians from formal state structures highlights their 
refugee status and precludes the development of feelings of loyalty or 
belonging to Lebanon which, in a more inclusive environment, might have 
developed over the 60 years. The host community’s deliberate attempts to 
alienate the Palestinians have raised the potential threat they pose to 
Lebanon’s stability. The so-called “security islands”, which is how the 
Lebanese authorities refer to the camps, arguing that they ensure Lebanon’s 
security, have led to the warehousing of Palestinian refugees. Ironically, it is 
this warehousing that generates Palestinian hostility towards the Lebanese 
and increases the potential threat they pose to security (Roberts 169). 
 
To avoid alienating the Syrians as it happened with Palestinians and to 
contain them instead of forcing them into supposed “security islands”, one should 
also learn from the Jordanian experience and how integrating the Palestinian refugees 
there, helped in creating a feeling of belonging for at least as substantial part of them, 
Experience of Palestinians in Jordan is a proof on how integration and less restrictive 
host policies create better relations between refugees and host communities. The -
Lebanese state should be strict with Syrians on security level but more lenient on 
human level adopting more inclusive policies. The argument that the suffering of 
Syrian refugees would be a catalyst for getting them back to their country was 
refuted by the Palestinian example. 
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5.2 Syrians in Jordan  
The number of Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR in Jordan is 658,015. 
141,099 of them live in camps, and 516,916 are self-settled in rural and urban areas.  
However, the real number exceeds a million according to Jordanian officials 
(UNHCR Warns Funding Cuts Threaten Aid). 
According to a study conducted by Khalid Al Wazani, the socio-economic 
implications of Syrian refugees on Jordan are similar to that of Lebanon. As Syrian 
refugees arrived to Jordan through unofficial borders, they were hosted in shelters, 
public parks, and public facilities. Government facilitated their reregistration with 
UNHCR that built offices around these shelters. They were also hosted by families.  
 
UNHCR said that living conditions for more than half a million refugees 
living outside of camps in the country had become increasingly tough, 
swelling the population of other camps. The latest survey showed 86 per cent 
of urban refugees live below the Jordanian poverty line of 68 JOD (approx. 
US$95) per capita per month (Rummery 2015). 
 
Like Lebanon, Syrians in Jordan are competing with Jordanians for jobs, 
especially that they agree to receive less wages, as they can adapt with financial aid 
they receive from UNHCR. Both refugees in Jordan and Lebanon work illegally. In 
Lebanon, Syrians need a work permit and despite past agreements between Syrian 
and Lebanese government, the latter is reluctant to issue such permits. In Jordan, it’s 
almost impossible to work legally as Syrians are obliged to show a proof that their 
specific skill is not available in Jordanian candidates. Thus, they work illegally and 
with lower wages (Verme et al). While in Lebanon the majority of refugees work 
illegally, in Jordan “according to the labour ministry, about 160,000 Syrians are 
working illegally. They mostly work in the informal sector and are exposed to 
hazards and exploitation” (Legal Status of Individuals Fleeing Syria). This also led to 
hostile relationship with host community.   
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The labor and trade problems may be a major driver of social tension. In July 
2013, the government lifted fuel subsidies and raised tax on 
telecommunications, sparking tensions between Jordanians and Syrians as the 
government tried to adapt to the largest wave of refugees ever seen by the 
country (Wazani 81). 
 
The hostile relation between Jordanian and Syrians was reflected in a 
statistical study published in Wazani’s report. It showed that in June 2013, 73.5% of 
the study population and 55% of opinion leaders would refuse entry to any new 
waves of Syrian refugees to Jordan. 87% of them said it would be better to keep the 
Syrians in refugee camps to prohibit them from integrating with local communities, 
while 92% of the study population claimed that the existence of Syrians in Jordan 
had compromised job opportunities for Jordanians (Wazani 81).  
Unlike Syrians in Lebanon, Syrians in Jordan receive financial housing 
subsidy from UNHCR. Moreover, in Jordan one can find Syrian families living 
together to share the burden of high rents. This caused an increase in rents the way it 
happened in Lebanon. “Real estate prices soared with the coming of Syrians by up to 
100%, making access to housing extremely difficult for Jordanians, especially 
newlywed couples” (Wazani 83).  
Also in Jordan costs are needed for social protection and health programs as 
70% of Syrian refugees consist of females and children below 11 years old.  “The 
government has spent, according to the Ministry of Health’s (MOH) reports, around 
US$35 million on medical care for the Syrian refuges between January and April 
2013, with only US$5 million provided in direct foreign aid during that period” 
(Wazani 80).   
In many villages in Lebanon like Al Marj and Kherbet Kanafar, the number 
of Syrian refuges is equal to the number of Lebanese citizens living in them. This 
scenario repeats itself in areas like Mafraq in Jordan that hosts 90,000 Syrian 
refugees who are equal in number to Jordanians living there, thus causing a 
demographic imbalance.   
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The Syrian refugee issue has, no doubt, increased the challenges already 
faced by Mafraq and Irbid. Especially, as a result of the increasing size and 
flow rates of refugees, the two governorates are suffering from great 
economic and institutional vulnerability. The host municipalities are 
encountering abnormality, both in terms of numbers and the demographic 
characteristics of new comers. The municipalities were already unprepared to 
address such pressures, which overstrain the infrastructure and other public 
services, including health, education, transport, garbage management, 
sanitation, water and power (Wazani  77). 
To control the Syrian refugees’ effect on Jordanian society, the government 
created a high commission mandated with Syrian refugees’ affairs. It also appointed 
Jordan Hashemite charity organization (JHCO) as the only agency authorized to deal 
with local and foreign charities willing to donate money, unlike Lebanon where 
many NGOs operate simultaneously without any cooperation leading to waste of 
efforts and money. Indeed, the presence of too many NGOs can harm the cause. 
Especially that they do not coordinate among each other to avoid duplicating funding 
for similar projects. They become rivals who compete over funds.  
Also, in cooperation with UNHCR, Al Za’atari camp was established in 2012 
in Mafraq that contain the largest number of Syrian refugees in Jordan. It became the 
second largest refugee camp in the world (Wazani 59-60). Za’atari camp “was 
supplied with the best possible infrastructure and was developed in line with the 
increasing inflows of refugees, climate and physical and structural needs. Four field 
schools were established…in addition to four field hospitals” (Wazani 60). It 
includes 80,000 registered refugees (Verme et al 40).   
According to UNHCR, the camp was set in nine days starting 2012, and grew with 
time. Refugees there faced problems with electricity and phone communication at the 
beginning. The tents that hosted refugees originally were replaced by prefabricated shelters 
(Rummery 2015). 
While there are no official refugee camps in Lebanon, where refugees are 
dispersed in local communities, Jordan built four camps that included 20% of the 
refugees at a time when 80% of them live in non-camp settings. In addition to 
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Za’atari, refugees live in Marjeeb al-Fahood, Cyber City, and Al-Azraq (Verme et al 
40).   
Unlike Lebanon, Syrian refugees in Jordan are exempted from any yearly 
payments that are required as their residency fees.   
 
5.3 Solutions based on Jordanian Experience  
Naturalizing Palestinians and granting them Jordanian citizenship have 
created a sense of national belonging among Jordanian Palestinians, unlike Lebanon 
where feelings of hostility were mutual among Lebanese and Palestinians. 
Naturalizing Syrians in Lebanon seems to be an “out of the question” solution. 
Nevertheless, Lebanese state can still follow some procedures to at least legalize the 
status of Syrian refugees in Lebanon especially that current procedures turned the 
majority of Syrians into illegal refugees. All Syrians interviewed by the researcher 
during her field study said that they couldn’t renew their residency because they 
couldn’t afford paying $200 for each member of the family, who is above 15 years 
old. It is not rational to ask poor families, who are living in tents, to pay this amount, 
whether they are registered with UNHCR or not.  
 
5.3.1 Recommendations  
5.3.1.1 Issuing Cards 
As Jordan did with Palestinians when it categorized them into groups ranging 
from passport holders, green, blue, pink and yellow card holders, Lebanese state can 
do the same with Syrians. These cards can organize the Syrians as working force. 
The government can force residency fees, over rich and middle class families and 
exempt poor families from these fees. Money earned can be used to help host 
communities.  
 
5.3.1.2 Prefabricated Shelters  
Renewing residency fees was one of the top issues that worried Syrian 
refugees in Al Marj, Kherbet Kanafar, and Haleneyeh. Another issue that they all 
shared was the fact that they have to pay between $200 and $300 each year as 
maintenance for their tents that are usually worn out by weather conditions. As some 
Syrian refugees have prefabricated shelters in Za’atari camp, UNHCR should reach 
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an agreement with Lebanese state and help refugees to gradually replace their tents 
with these shelters. Tents not only make refugees suffer from harsh weather 
conditions, but are also a waste of money. If UNHCR cannot afford this alone, it can 
share the burden with refugees who are already paying $300 each year for the 
maintenance of their tents. They can also find a sponsor from Gulf Arab countries 
who can also share the burden to finish this project. It is recommended to find a 
Lebanese manufacturer; thus Lebanese community can benefit from selling these 
prefabricated shelters. It’s true that these shelters might cost more money but they 
don’t need yearly maintenance fees. They are also the best solution for sunny 
summers and stormy winters. Moreover, when it is time for refugees to go back to 
Syria they can take these shelters with them especially that majority of refugees said 
that they lost their houses because of the war.  
UNHCR has already tried what it called the Refugee Housing Unit in 
Ethiopia. It cooperated with a non-profit Swedish industrial design firm and the 
IKEA Foundation to replace tents with these units. In the same way UNHCR can 
cooperate with non-profit organizations or find sponsors from Gulf countries or 
international societies to replace tents of Syrian refugees with similar units.  
 
Constructed of waterproof, sun and flame retardant materials around a steel frame, 
each unit was designed with solar lights that minimize the need to use open flames 
and allow for reading and studying inside. The frame and recyclable, non-toxic 
panels were specially designed to withstand the strong winds yet be light enough to 
be shipped halfway around the globe in flat-packed boxes…With additions like a 
shade net, the modular unit truly becomes a semi-permanent home, where families 
feel protected and comfortable (Better Shelter Unit). 
 
5.3.1.3 Supervising NGOs   
The third recommendation, based on Jordanian experience, is putting 
Lebanese State Ministry for Refugee Affairs in charge for coordinating and 
organizing the work of different NGOs to make sure that they don’t provide similar 
aid and services to same informal settlements, guaranteeing that the largest number 
of refugees are benefiting from these organizations. Some of the refugees met by the 
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researcher complained that NGOs are not being fair in their distributions and stressed 
that some settlements didn’t receive any help at a time when other settlements get 
simultaneous help from different groups.  
 
5.3.1.4 Housing Allowance  
Last but not least, as UNHCR provides housing subsidy for Syrian refugees 
in Jordan, it should provide housing allowance to most vulnerable Syrian refugees in 
Lebanon, if helping all registered refugees is not possible. In 2013 while covering a 
news story, the researcher met Um Mohammad, she was an old lady in her early 
seventies selling tissues on Verdun Street. She said that she lost the three of her sons 
during the Syrian war and she was selling tissues because she became the only 
family provider for her grandchildren. She was living in a small room in Ouzaii and 
taking care of seven kids; the eldest was 6 years old. A year later the researcher met 
the same women by coincidence in an informal settlement in Ketermaya. She moved 
to a tent with her grandchildren. She said that she couldn’t afford keeping them in 
that small room. Um Mohammad represents one of the most vulnerable refugees and 
people like her should not be left alone to fight for their living.    
Jordan is an example of a country that overlooked security threats posed by 
Palestinians as they first arrived to Jordan and succeeded in integrating a large 
number of them on the long run, at a time when Lebanon is still suffering from 
security threats posed by Palestinian camps that became shelters for extremist 
groups. Those who were sent in booby-trapped cars to kill themselves in Beirut 
southern suburb were connected in one way or another to Palestinian camps. 
Lebanese shouldn’t repeat the same mistake with Syrians and blame them for 
kidnapping Lebanese soldiers or for turning the borders of Arsal into battlefields. On 
the contrary, they should understand that refugees are hurt more than the Lebanese 
by such actions, and that they can do nothing about them. Naturalizing the Syrians 
seems impossible for the time being but the Lebanese state should find another way 
to embrace and integrate Syrian refugees.  
 
5.4 Camps vis-à-vis Settlements…   
Before comparing camps to settlements and studying the pros and cons of 
each model to decide which is the best model suitable for hosting Syrian refugees, 
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one should keep in mind two aspects: first at a time when Syrian refugees in Lebanon 
prefer the current situation and would rather stay in informal dispersed settlements, 
Lebanese host community prefers to build camps and host the refugees in them. The 
second aspect is Lebanon’s bad experience in managing camps and keeping its 
refugees safe the way it dealt with Palestinian camps, knowing that they serve as the 
worst model of similar camps in the region.  
On the other hand, the main difference between settlements and camps is that 
the first encourages integration and creates a less dependable community, whereas 
the second hinders integration and creates a community that depends on external 
assistance. UNHCR is finding troubles in getting full funding, thus many refugees 
have been suspended from its program. In turn, this created a dependable refugee 
community, which on the long run might jeopardize the lives of thousands of 
refugees.  
 
An appeal for the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan, or 3RP, for 2017 
was launched in Helsinki in January - seeking US$4.63 billion. So far, only 
US$433 millon — or 9 per cent of the funding sought — has been received, 
aggravating an already precarious situation. Last year’s plan received just 63 
per cent (US$2.88 billion) of the US$4.54 billion requested. This has left 
Syrian refugees – over 70 per cent of whom are women and children – facing 
the prospect of deep cuts to health, shelter, protection and other services 
(UNHCR Warns Funding Cuts threaten Aid). 
 
In her study that was published in Forced Migration Online, Anna Schmidt 
talked about the advantages and disadvantages of both camps and settlements. She 
mentioned that while camps ignore the resources and capacities of refugees 
themselves, defenders of camps emphasize their advantages in “facilitating organized 
repatriation of refugees, attracting international assistance due to the higher visibility 
of impact, and their superior ability to monitor and target recipients and distribute aid 
faster and more effectively” (Schmidt 7). She also notices that camps assure the most 
basic right, the right to life by becoming a part of international ‘burden sharing’. 
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However, other critics warn from endangering more basic rights like restrictions on 
freedom of movement (Schmidt 11). 
Camps also pose a sort of security threat. “Camps do not solve security 
problems. They are in fact added sources of instability and insecurity … because 
they aggravate existing security problems and create new ones” (The Forgotten 
Solution 13). Camps also “provide fertile ground for recruitment of young men and 
woman for military activities by rebel groups” (Schmidt 13). 
 
There is widespread evidence that refugees import with them the security 
problems of the regions they flee, and create new dynamics in the RHA that 
lead to other security problems like crime. As shown in the Appendix, both 
camp and self- settled refugees are subject to a range of dangers, including 
direct attacks on camps, military recruitment, and resentment and abuse by 
locals and authorities. From the perspective of the host government, placing 
refugees in camps might seem to address these problems. Camps sequester 
refugees from the host population, and make them easier to monitor and 
control.  However, camps do not solve security problems and are in fact 
added sources of instability and insecurity for the RHA because they 
aggravate existing security problems and create new ones (The Forgotten 
Solution 13). 
 
Camps include ingredients for crime and violence where frustrated men 
become more open to get involved with militias and to commit organized crimes. 
Crimes for example flourished in some camps especially in West Africa and the 
Thai-Burmese border that became zones of drug smuggling, human trafficking, 
illegal logging, and gun running (The Forgotten Solution 13).  
Moreover, Jacobson finds in her study that self-settlements are safer when 
camps become targets to enemies.  On the other hand, it is difficult for UNHCR and 
NGOs to reach self-settled refugees and protect them.  
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It is true that planned settlements focus on productive potential of the 
refugees making them independent of international aid. However, the success of 
planned settlements also depends on the economic capacity of host community which 
plays a role in facilitating or hindering integration. It is believed that for the benefits 
of local economy it’s better to keep refugees within camps, thus international 
community can share their economic burden.   
Gaim Kibreab argued that with Africa being unable to provide essential goods 
and services for its citizens because of its economic problems makes integration 
“wishful thinking based on inadequate understanding of the economic, social and 
political realities of the present day Africa” (Kibreab 474). Thus it’s better to keep 
refugees in camps or even planned settlements as long as they are not self-settled.  
However, integration would seem an acceptable choice if refugees bring with 
them new goods and services without inflicting any competition to the local citizens.  
Otherwise, integration according to Jacobson would have a negative effect on local 
labor market. If refugees are more skilled or agree to take fewer wages, there is a 
possibility that they will displace local people and replace them. This, on the other 
hand, would bring positive consequences for the overall economy and productivity of 
the host country.   
Tom Corsellis and Antonella Vitale tried to summarize the different types of 
hosting methods in their book Transitional Settlements: Displaced Populations. They 
divided their methods into grouped settlements which include collective centers and 
self-settled camps vis-à-vis dispersed settlements where refugees stay with host 
families or on their own in rural or urban areas.  
The authors argue that it is more difficult for refugees in group settlements to 
achieve durable solutions in comparison to those from dispersed settlements. 
Refugees in dispersed settlements rely more on each other and on their own 
capabilities. Whereas, refugees in grouped settlements act collectively, relying 
heavily on external assistance (Corsellis and Vitale 69).  
The below table summarizes the disadvantages of both models. 
 
Table 1: Comparison between dispersed and grouped settlements 
Problems with dispersed settlements  Problems with grouped settlements  
Refugees self-settle close to border areas Risk to security of both displaced and 
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which may increase their vulnerability  in 
addition to the vulnerability of host 
society  
host society as camps might encourage 
insurgency by armed forces 
Compromised security if there is history 
of hostility between refugees and host 
community  or whether they have 
different ethnic or political background  
Concentration of demand of natural 
sources  
Confusion to aid agencies making 
assessment of need difficult resulting in 
inappropriate assistance programs also 
affecting speed and efficiency of aid 
Segregation causes inequality of support 
offered to refugees with respect to host 
communities, which might create tension   
Sometimes, security and stability brought 
by local authorities and aid communities 
can be enhanced more if refugees are 
concentrated into groups  
De-skilling and increased dependency 
within displaced population  
 High capital investment without knowing 
how much the situation will remain 
  (Corsellis, Vitale 72-73) 
 
5.5 Suggesting Possible Methods and Solutions to Host Syrian 
Refugees in Lebanon 
While UNHCR suggested building camps in the Bekaa Valley, Lebanese 
government insisted that any camp should be built in border areas9. Members of 
Lebanese host community also favored the option of camps in border areas at a time 
when Syrians preferred the current form of informal settlements dispersed in 
different Lebanese areas.  
UNHCR took a good decision when it refused to build camps on border areas 
knowing that they are not secured by Lebanese security forces and can be targeted by 
both extremist groups and Syrian regime. This option does not only pose danger over 
the refugees but it can also intensify already existing insecurity of border areas, 
risking the security of border villages. While hosting all refugees in camps is rejected 
by Lebanese government, UNHCR should suggest the possibility of hosting the most 
vulnerable refugees in a camp that can be built in the Bekaa Valley. This camp shall 
                                                          
9 This was thoroughly discussed in chapter 2 
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only include refugees who cannot depend on themselves, and who can only survive 
on international assistance. They include elderly, orphans, sick refugees, and 
refugees with physical and mental disabilities who lost their caregiver. Having these 
people in a camp would make it easier for them to get needed assistance and refugees 
like these won’t cause security threat for the host community.  
Other refugees who are content in staying in informal settlements, at a time 
when Lebanese government refuses the possibility of building camps, can stay where 
they are as they wish. Informal settlements help refugees depend on themselves, 
especially when UNHCR complains about not getting sufficient funds. Nevertheless, 
their legal status should be adjusted by exempting them from yearly residency fees.  
This seems as the most reasonable solution, which is the closest to local 
integration that is suggested by UNHCR as one of three durable solutions, in addition 
to voluntary repatriation and resettlement.  
Voluntary repatriation seems currently impossible, since Syria is still not a 
safe place to return to, and most of the refugees that the researcher has met refuse to 
go back until the war is totally over. As for resettlement it is transferring refugees 
from an asylum country to another to be granted permanent settlement.  
 
UNHCR is mandated by its Statute and the UN General Assembly 
Resolutions to undertake resettlement as one of the three durable solutions. 
Resettlement is unique in that it is the only durable solution that involves the 
relocation of refugees from an asylum country to a third country. There were 
16.1 million refugees of concern to UNHCR around the world at the end of 
2015, but less than one per cent were resettled that year (Bavman 2017). 
 
According to UNHCR 16,300 Syrian refugees were sent to a third country 
leaving Lebanon in 2016. Although this is a step that helps Lebanon in decreasing 
the number of refugees, however more than a million refugees are still in Lebanon. 
Thus dealing with their presence is indispensable.    
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5.5.1 Compensating the Lebanese Host Society  
To keep refugees in their informal settlements as they wish, UNHCR in 
addition to NGOs should compensate host communities in order to help Lebanese 
locals overcome their incurred hardships and resentments.  
 
There is evidence to suggest that poorer host communities can be hurt by 
refugee influxes. At the start of a refugee emergency, the condition of the 
host community should be assessed to determine assistance required by that 
community as well as that required by the refugee population (Chambers, 42-
43). 
 
On the other hand, the Lebanese society and international community should 
expect that Syrians would not leave Lebanon anytime soon as the situation in their 
homeland is still dangerous with many international players taking part in the war 
over there. Hence “mechanisms to protect and assist refugees need to be changed to 
provide effective long-term support that is sustainable and promotes development, 
returns dignity and self-respect to refugees’ groups, and is acceptable to the host 
community” (Roberts 1). 
The major problem of how UNHCR dealt with helping Syrian refugees is that 
it didn’t implement durable solutions from the beginning, at a time when its 
representatives always complained about not getting enough funds. 
 
The problem with funding is that it either targets relief programs or 
development, which creates what the author called “relief-development gap”. 
Refugees and development are usually perceived as two different issues, they 
deal with refugees as a temporary situation and emergencies, that’s why they 
focus on the need of relief instead of development, lacking the skills and 
experience of long-term planning (Roberts 40-41). 
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Although, better planning should have been implemented from the beginning, 
nevertheless UNHCR, the international community, NGOs and the Lebanese 
government can still network to improve the situation.  
 
5.5.2 Role of the Lebanese State and the International Community  
This thesis shows how Lebanese host community changed from welcoming 
the Syrians and helping them, to blaming them for their economic and social 
deterioration. That’s why depending on shared norms, beliefs, and culture becomes 
insufficient to maintain a healthy relationship between refugees and host community. 
Although, constructivism explains why Lebanon opened its borders to the refugees 
despite the fact that it is not a part of 1951 Convention or other international 
treatment, it sets the basics of liberalism that will help Lebanese government keep 
refugees within its state, without risking its stability and security.  
Thus, this thesis will mainly refer to liberal school while studying possible 
recommendations to be applied by Lebanese state, in order to help it deal with the 
economic and social burden of Syrian refugees on its host communities.  
While international community should share the burden with the Lebanese 
state, the latter has also to play a role in reaching international community, and 
convince it to help Lebanon and its host community in accommodating more than a 
million and a half Syrian refugees. In her book The Refugee in International Society: 
Between Sovereigns, Emma Haddad talked about refugees as responsibility of the 
whole international society, asserting the role of international institutions in ensuring 
sovereign and equal states that guarantee human rights in general and rights of 
refugees in particular.  
"The (modern) refugee is only fully intelligible within the context of a 
pluralist system of states in which individual political communities fail to guarantee 
the content of substantive sovereignty" (Haddad 63). 
Syrian refugees are not the sole responsibility of Lebanon. They didn’t 
choose it as their exile neither did Lebanon offer help. However, due to its close 
distance to Syria and shared culture and family ties, Lebanon was one of the few 
options that were considered as a safe haven for Syrians. International and Arab 
community are obliged to support Lebanon in taking over the responsibility to help 
refugees and provide them with the economic and social aids needed to guarantee 
decent living conditions.  
72 
 
On the other hand, Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher talked about the 
concept of “cross-issue persuasion” where UNHCR plays a role in convincing 
Northern powerful states to help southern weak ones, in their mission of hosting 
refugees. Southern states become the refugees’ destination only because of their 
geographical location. South states lack economic and social factors that enable them 
to bear the consequences turning them into asylum countries. That’s why north states 
should take part in sharing the burden and it is the duty of UNHCR to convince them 
about the nature and scope of this cooperation.  
Lebanon and UNHCR can use the pretext of terrorist attacks taking place in 
different European countries to warn about dangerous outcomes if refugees are not 
helped, as they can be radicalized and may also be obliged to take illegal routes of 
migration.  Extremist groups can also succeed in recruiting refugees due to their 
economic needs, which will worsen regional and international security.  
What Lebanon should ask for is development projects that benefit both its 
citizens and Syrian refugees in addition to better access to education and 
employment. However, development plans are hindered by the distrust between 
international donors and host societies.  
 
Donors may suspect that host society is propagating for development plans to 
personally benefit from the international aid instead of helping the refugees. 
On the other hand, when international donors would positively like to pursue 
development plans, host society would worry that their intentions hide 
inclinations to permanently integrate refugees within host society (Roberts 
41).  
 
Both Lebanese government and international community should acknowledge 
that a well-established development plan isn’t only good for Lebanese community 
but also for Syrian refugees. Knowing that high percentage of Syrian refugees live in 
Bekaa and in north Lebanon, it is good to mention that these two regions suffer the 
most. 
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“Sixty per cent of the registered Syrian refugees are in the North and Beka’a 
Valley regions, which are also the poorest regions in Lebanon. These two 
regions have been historically marginalized as reconstruction after the end of 
the civil war in Lebanon in 1990 saw most wealth flow to the greater Beirut 
region” (Dahi 2014).  
 
International organizations should support villages that receive refugees to 
encourage them.   
 
Assistance given to refugees had long-term consequences for their integration 
into host societies, and for the economic and political development of host 
states. Assistance could create resentment against refugees, especially when 
the host society was also suffering from deprivation or political tension, as 
after the First World War. This highlights a particular risk: when assistance to 
refugees is perceived as being a kind of favoritism provided by external 
actors, or coming at the cost of local taxpayers, tensions can quickly rise 
(White et al 2016). 
 
Additionally, when Lebanon was in the midst of its reconstruction boom in 
the late nineties, 600,000 to 700,000 seasonal Syrian migrant workers, worked in the 
big infrastructure projects and in agriculture. Launching similar projects, funded by 
the international community, building highways, school and hospitals, can ensure the 
proper infrastructure to host communities help them bear the burden of thousands of 
refugees, and at the same time employ thousands of Syrians and Lebanese in good 
paying jobs.  
Natural resources, in addition to electric and health services have been 
affected by the huge refugee influx in regions that are already underdeveloped. 
Municipalities should be given greater role in carrying out development projects by 
74 
 
cooperating with UNHCR as they know best the needs of their local society. 
However, UNHCR should be responsible for deciding how to finance the projects.  
 
Shifting to development means investment in upgrading the water, electricity 
and health infrastructure as well as launching projects (perhaps with mixed 
public and private sector involvement) that can generate jobs and alleviate 
poverty. These must target the most vulnerable areas such as the Beka’a 
Valley and the North in Lebanon and the Mafraq governorate in Jordan. Such 
spending should target all vulnerable communities particularly in the most 
under-served areas. Development initiatives administered by the state such as 
infrastructural investment in services, health care, education and job creation, 
and targeting host communities as well as refugees, have the benefit of 
strengthening state capacity and relieving tensions at the same time as 
addressing refugees’ needs (Dahi 2014). 
 
Other projects should include training programs to teach Syrian refugees 
activities that they can rely on for their living, to make them less dependent on 
humanitarian aids.   
 
Most refugees are children who therefore have specific needs in terms of 
schooling, training, and health care. If refugee children do not go to school, 
human capital cannot be built, with consequent long term developmental 
implications. Understanding the potential dimensions of this loss helps to 
design policies that prevent or at least mitigate these losses (Verme et al 44). 
 
For this purpose, international community should take part in improving 
public school sector in Lebanon, to help both Lebanese and Syrian students. Public 
schools in Lebanon work in two shifts, the morning shift includes Lebanese students 
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and afternoon shift includes Syrian students. Still almost half of Syrian children are 
not registered in schools in Lebanon.  It’s important for Lebanese as much as it is 
important for Syrians to send Syrian students to get an education because “by failing 
to educate refugee children, the international community is not only dashing their 
hopes and aspirations but also turning a blind eye to potential environments where 
violent extremism can take hold” (Brandt and Robert 2017). 
International community should also improve employment opportunities and 
help in opening markets to Syrian refuges. This can be done by initiating 
partnerships with private sectors in host societies, in a way to create working 
opportunities without negatively affecting the position of Lebanese locals.  
This can be done by “enabling refugees to access seed funding to start new 
businesses, and where necessary providing them with the technical assistance to do 
so; and procuring goods and services from businesses that hire refugees” (Brandt and 
Robert 2017). 
Increasing foreign aid is the only way that will make all these 
recommendations possible. Unfortunately “Syrian Crisis Fund, intended to finance 
the internationally agreed humanitarian response plan for Syria and the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) regional refugee and resilience plan, is less 
than half funded” (Brandt 2016). International community should know that by 
funding these projects they are not only helping Lebanon and other host countries but 
also helping themselves by keeping these refugees in Lebanon rather than hosting 
them in their own countries and tolerating the burden. 
 
5.6 Conclusion  
This paper has reached the conclusion that it’s better for refugees to remain in 
their informal settlements, as per their wishes, if the other option is keeping them in 
camps built between the Syrian and Lebanese borders. Although border camps are 
preferred by Lebanese government and people, nevertheless, these camps are 
dangerous for both the Syrians and Lebanese security, as they can be on one hand 
targeted by Syrian army and on the other hand be turned into a harbor for extremist 
groups in border areas.  
It is true that all Lebanese locals interviewed preferred hosting refugees in 
camps. However, the intensity of hostility differed from one village to the other. 
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Local politics definitely had its effect on the relationship between refugees and 
different host communities. The highly tensed relation between locals of Al Marj and 
Syrian refugees can be attributed to the fact that Al Marj didn’t draw limits from the 
beginning when Syrian refugees first arrived. The Sunni village was totally 
supportive of the Syrian revolution and Syrian refugees who fled Assad’s regime. 
That’s why Syrians found themselves able to work in different fields, which led to 
higher competition with the locals of Al Marj.  
On the other hand, the scenario was different in Al Haleneyeh and Kherbet 
Kanafar. While in the first village Hezbollah tried to keep the situation under its 
control drawing limits for the refugees from the beginning, locals of Kherbet Kanafar 
knew what they wanted from the refugees and benefited from the services they 
supply, which are usually not fulfilled by the locals. Still, the locals of both villages 
showed some concerns related to high number of refugees; however, they reflected 
less hostile emotions than their counterparts in Al Haleneyeh.   
Future research can try to tackle this issue by studying larger number of 
villages with different sectarian background. Elaborating on this angle can show how 
local politics affect the relations between refugees and host communities. Future 
research can also elaborate more on what development projects could the Lebanese 
government adopt and how they can be financed by international community and 
rich Arab countries in order to ease the hostile relations between refugees and host 
communities.  
Meanwhile, knowing that the received aid funds don’t exceed 60% of needed 
amount received in 2016, it is better not to turn refugees into dependent individuals 
who rely on international aids but to survive relying on their own capabilities.  Thus:  
a) Municipalities should take part with UNHCR to organize these informal 
settlements and to carry out development projects that benefit both groups. 
Public school sector, water, electric, health, and road infrastructure projects 
should be implemented as they provide parallel benefits for locals and 
refugees.  
b) Tents should be replaced with prefabricated shelters. Residency fees should 
be cancelled.  
c) Funding should be increased and host villages should be included in 
assistantship programs to facilitate integration of Syrian refugees. Also the 
West should play a role in creating employment opportunities.   
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d) Informal settlements can still facilitate repatriation as soon as the war in Syria 
is over. Also they can facilitate the work of NGOs that can reach the refugees 
easily under the condition that the effort of NGOs is organized under one 
official representative.   
e) Although camps should be avoided, nevertheless, there is no harm in 
constructing a camp inside Bekaa to host most vulnerable refugees who 
cannot integrate within the society.  
 
It is the duty of the developed countries to help Lebanon in hosting Syrian 
refugees, otherwise these refugees will seek illegal roots to move into these 
developed countries or they will be an easy target for extremist groups. Fighting 
poverty will help sustain stability in the region and in the world.  
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